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Preface
This doctoral dissertation is comprised of three chapters, two of which deal with problems in
the field of Political Economy, while the last one is concerned with organizational economics.
In particular, the first two chapters focus on the implications of commitment problems in
the political sphere for (democratic) decision making. The last chapter studies the incentives
of agents to acquire information in the presence of career concerns. The chapters are self
contained and can be read independently.
Chapter 1 capitalizes on the idea that governments, through their policy choices, have the
possibility to alter the incentives of their successors. We employ this mechanism to explain
the widely observed prevalence of inefficient transfer instruments as e.g. tariffs or output
subsidies. Why do governments find it preferable to transfer resources in an inefficient way,
thereby distorting economic activity, if more efficient instruments (e.g. lump sum transfers)
are available?
To answer this question we build a dynamic model of the interaction between special interest
groups and a policy maker. The model builds on the key insight that inefficient transfer
instruments lead to inefficiently high levels of production and capacity in an industry. As
capacity is costly to adjust both policy makers and special interest groups have a higher
incentive to sustain inefficient transfers as compared to efficient ones. This mechanism has
profound effects on the outcome of the lobbying game.
Since the special interest group must compensate the policy maker for the aggravated distor-
tions of inefficient transfers, the lump sum transfer is always more attractive if the players
interact only once. This is one of the central results of the earlier literature on this topic which
finds that, whenever efficient instruments are available, they will be employed. Following the
logic outlined above, however, we demonstrate that this is not necessarily true given that the
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special interest group has a longer time horizon. The fact that future governments are more
reluctant to cut back the transfer once overcapacities have been accumulated, reduces the
expenses necessary to induce politicians in the future to sustain the subsidy. But does this
not run counter to the interest of the policy maker who also cares about future contributions
from the lobby group? The answer is affirmative only if the policy maker stays in office for
sure. As soon as this is not the case he anticipates that (in expectation) part of the reduced
contributions from the special interest group must be borne by his successors. We show that
the policy maker can even extract a share of the special interest group’s future gain today. It
might therefore be strictly preferable for governments to grant inefficient transfers, thereby
collecting part of the rents which otherwise would have been captured by their successors.
In a natural next step we extend the model to study competition between interest groups. We
demonstrate that not only do inefficient transfers still exist under these circumstances, the
probability of introducing them actually increases. It has long been noted in the literature
that interest groups competing for a given pool of efficient transfers are caught in a miser-
able position. With competing lobby groups the policy maker is in a much better bargaining
position since he can pit lobbies against each other. With solely efficient transfer instruments
available, he can do so perfectly, as he is indifferent which interest group to grant favors to.
Hence, this leaves the lobbies with no bargaining power and therefore, with no rents. This
prisoners dilemma type of situation seems to be somewhat at odds with the sharply raising
number of political action committees and interest groups in the US, as in theory each lobby
loses nothing by unilaterally abandoning its influence activities. Therefore the theoretical
result raises some concern about why lobbies manage to organize in the first place.
However, as soon as lobbies were able to obtain the inefficient transfer in the past the situ-
ation changes drastically. Ceteris paribus, the policy maker now wants to spread transfers
evenly among special interest groups so as to minimize costly capacity adjustment. In the
parlance of industrial organization the lobby groups now appear differentiated in the politi-
cian’s eyes and are therefore able to capture some part of the rents. It is thus their desire
to escape the very harsh consequences of competition in the future if no overcapacities have
been accumulated so far, that makes the special interest groups even more eager to obtain
the inefficient transfer, if they have to compete against each other.
In the second chapter we depart from the idea that a politician’s concern is to influence future
governments. Instead the main focus here is how a politician’s actions in the past constrain
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his behavior later in his career. The mechanism which links past and present is the policy
maker’s concern about the electorate’s perception of his competence. Revising one’s policy
positions is equivalent to admitting that one had wrong opinions in the past, which in turn
signals a low level of competence.
We employ this logic in a model of electoral competition and post-electoral policy making
to study the policy maker’s incentive to keep or break his campaign promises. The model
bridges the two prevalent modeling approaches which are used to investigate electoral com-
petition so far. Whereas in models of pre-electoral politics candidates can commit to policies
ex ante, the approach of post-election politics starts from the presumption that, once in of-
fice, politicians are unconstrained to pursue their own agenda. However, both approaches
seem to be at odds with the empirical evidence.1 This constitutes a severe problem as the
question of the credibility of campaign promises is of central importance to understand both
the selection of politicians and policy implementation. Given that campaign promises are
at least partially binding they impact policy making after the elections. Anticipating this,
candidates may distort their platforms in order to be able to uphold their reputation ex post
which influences their attractiveness in the voter’s eyes and hence, their chances to win the
election.
In the model we develop, a tension exists between a policy maker’s concern to maintain
his reputation and the usage of new information which becomes available after the election.
While deviating from one’s own platform and adapting to new information increases the
chance of successful policy making it depresses at the same time the politician’s reputation.
We establish that an equilibrium can be supported where agents distort their platform but
where nevertheless a substantial amount of ex post available information is used. In this
equilibrium unexpected or surprising platforms earn a higher reputation and are chosen in-
efficiently often.
Central to the investigation is the question which incentives govern the politician’s policy
implementation decision. In contrast to approaches that impose an exogenous cost accruing
upon platform revision, we relate the propensity to break campaign promises to the environ-
ment in which the politician operates. We show that the degree of uncertainty about the
candidate’s competence, the amount of observability or the electorate’s assessment capability
of the appropriateness of a given policy measure, and the ex ante probability of a certain
1See chapter 2 for references.
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policy to be optimal are driving determinants of the politician’s ex post behavior. Moreover,
the model is extended to provide a rationale for the optimality of ambiguous platforms and
the widely observed behavior of politicians to renege on a subset of their campaign promises.
In the last chapter we stick to the assumption that agents are concerned about their reputation
but leave the sphere of Political Economy and consider a rather general setting instead. In
particular, we examine the consequences of additional information acquisition by experts, i.e.
agents who are mainly concerned about the assessment of their ability to receive and process
information. Typical examples for experts include fund managers whose task it is to identify
profitable investment opportunities, analysts, judges or politicians.2 In all those applications
it seems reasonable to assume that agents can in principle acquire additional information.
In order to analyze this issue we build a multi period model where agents receive information
in every period. Agent’s desire to signal their competence leads to inefficiencies even if they
obtain only one piece of information. In particular, those agents who receive noisy information
should mainly follow the prior, while more competent types should condition more strongly
on the information they receive. Hence, under efficient decision making, the behavior of
good agents will be more variable. As incompetent types try to mimic good ones, they will
therefore contradict the prior inefficiently often.
It turns out that more information on the agent’s side does not unambiguously benefit the
principal. Of course, more information improves the quality of decision making which benefits
both the principal and the agent. However, in some situations the behavior of the agents is
further distorted through more information acquisition. To understand this remember that
the source of inefficiency lies in the fact that incompetent agent’s posterior assessment of the
true state of the world is more concentrated around the prior than the posterior of good types.
If more information is accumulated this discrepancy becomes even more pronounced. Better
type’s information is true with a higher probability and for that reason more correlated over
time which implies that good agents are likely to receive identical signals. The reverse logic
holds for incompetent types who receive contradictory information more often. Hence from
a first best perspective, good types should condition even more strongly on their information
while the behavior of the unable types should not change by much. In their attempt to
mimic their competent counterparts the behavior of bad agents can therefore be even more
2See chapter 3 for detailed references.
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distorted.
In the model we derive sufficient conditions under which the above reasoning holds true.
Moreover, we discuss possibilities how the principal can constrain information acquisition by
the agents, in case he may be hurt by additional inefficiencies.
Chapter 1
Political Insulation and Lobbying
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1.1 Introduction
One of the largest parts of government activity concerns redistribution across citizens. While
part of the resources redistributed flow to large groups in the society such as the poor and
can be justified on normative grounds, a large share is captured by small groups which have
been able to organize powerful lobbies. In the last decades, a lot of work has been devoted
to analyzing how lobbies can influence the political decision process and appropriate some
resources at the expense of the general public.1
A far less investigated field is however which policy instruments are used in the political equi-
librium to transfer resources to interest groups. A surprising observation is that apparently
most of the instruments used in reality take an inefficient form. Examples abound: think of
subsidies to agriculture in almost all countries of the world or of the wide use of tariffs and
quotas which protect certain industries from competition. To be sure there could be reasons
for such policies to be optimal, e.g. externalities or infant industry protection. However by
now most scholars agree this is not the prime reason for such policies.2 It is far from obvious
how such inefficient transfers can survive in the political market. As forcefully argued by the
so called Chicago School there are (at least) two arguments against inefficient redistribution
devices. First, politicians who use them will simply be voted out of office and second, ineffi-
cient instruments will mobilize the rest of society since it has to bear the lion’s share of the
associated deadweight loss.3 Hence, interest groups could obtain more resources by replacing
inefficient instruments with efficient ones.
In this paper I propose a theory of inefficient redistribution which is based on dynamic
considerations of the political actors. Specifically, interest groups do not only care about
current transfers but also whether they will receive resources in the future. Therefore, it
might be profitable for them to lobby for policies which are hard to reverse by succeeding
governments. Political scientists have coined the term “insulation” for such policies4 and I
will argue that precisely the widely observed inefficient transfer instruments have the property
1See Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a comprehensive overview of the existing literature.
2See for example Gisser (1993).
3See for example, Stigler (1971), Becker (1983) and Wittman (1989) for work in the tradition of the Chicago
School.
4See e.g. de Figueiredo (2002) and the references therein.
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that they are insulated against future reversal. The starting observation is that almost all
inefficient transfers we encounter in reality, be it a price or output subsidy or a tariff, lead to
overproduction and thus overcapacities in an industry. In contrast, an efficient, e.g. lump sum
transfer clearly has no distorting effect. Cutting back an inefficient transfer therefore leads to
a reallocation of production factors in the economy which, albeit efficiency enhancing in the
long run may lead to some cost in the short run. As an example, the production factor may
have been partially specialized in the meantime or the market for the production factor may
exhibit frictions such that its owner would suffer an income loss in case of reallocation. Hence
a politician knows that if he is to introduce some inefficient transfer today, his successor will
be more willing to sustain the policy. Thus insulation in the present model works through a
change in the preferences of future governments.5
Is the effect outlined above really so strong that inefficient policies survive for that reason?
Eventually, the income loss of a few members of society must be traded off against an overall
welfare improvement. There is some evidence that politicians are willing to sacrifice welfare
gains, especially in order to avoid rising unemployment. As an example some politicians in
Britain supported ongoing subsidies to the (highly unprofitable) coal industry in order “to
ease the pain that will be caused by the loss of 2,500 jobs”. Similarly, Dominique Bussereau,
the French minister for agriculture justified France’s obstinate resistance to reform of the
European Union’s agricultural policy by noting that “tens of thousands of jobs would be
at risk”.6 Since Bussereaus claim that ten thousands of jobs are at risk is probably an
exaggeration, it is noteworthy that the number of job losses appears to be quite small in both
examples.
Until now we have said nothing about who gains from political insulation. Clearly, for the
argument to work, the present government must value the fact that the policy is sustained
somehow. The mechanism by which this is achieved in the model is that interest groups
anticipate that they will have to bribe future governments less for a transfer in case of
political insulation. The additional rents which the interest group can thereby capture can
be shared with the present ruler who may be able to extract even more resources from the
lobby compared to the case of lump sum payments to the interest group. Hence the present
5This mechanism distinguishes this paper from Coate and Morris (1999) where insulation of a certain policy
stems from the lobbies’ higher willingness to pay for its maintenance once it is enacted.
6These examples are taken from the Economist: see “Bottomless pits”, April 18th, 2002 and “European farm
follies”, December 8th, 2005.
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government and the lobby collude at the expense of future rulers.
This paper contributes to an old dispute between the Chicago and the Virginia School7 about
how to interpret policies which seem to be inefficient at a first glance. While the proponents
of the Chicago School (see the references above) argue that due to political competition
seemingly inefficient policies can be given an efficiency rationale, the Virginia School posits
that inefficient transfers can emerge since they can be better disguised. This argument was
formalized by Coate and Morris (1995), who show that inefficient policies may prevail if
voters are both uncertain about the politician’s preferences and the welfare consequences of
a certain policy. The drawback of this argument is that the policy under consideration must
be welfare enhancing in at least some states of the world. However, if one takes agricultural
subsidies in the European Union this is hardly the case: at least at the point where huge
sums had to be expended in order to export agricultural overproduction it was obvious that
the subsidies paid to farmers do not correct for some market failure.8
Another strand of the literature explains inefficient redistribution on grounds of an improved
bargaining position of the politician vis-a-vis the lobbies. A commitment to inefficient transfer
instruments on the politician’s side might limit the amount of resources redistributed as in
Rodrik (1986), Wilson (1990) and Becker and Mulligan (1998) or even help the politician to
extract more bribes from the interest groups as in Drazen and Limao (2007). However, a
somewhat arbitrary assumption in these papers is that the policy maker can commit to the
transfer instruments but not to the level of redistribution.
At the heart of our theory is a commitment problem which is prevalent in the political arena.9
Specifically the actions of future governments can not be constrained by explicit contract but
only through institutions or today’s policy choice. The latter mechanism is not new: it has
first been explored by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) in the
context of public debt accumulation. Here the argument goes that a present conservative
government might want to accumulate debt to be repaid tomorrow in order to constrain
spending behavior of future (more left wing) governments.
We apply a similar mechanism to inefficient redistribution to lobby groups. The paper closest
7See, for example, Tullock (1983).
8This fact also invalidates autarchy arguments in favor of these subsidies.
9See Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Acemoglu (2003) for an extensive discussion and a wide array of
applications of the commitment problem in politics.
Political Insulation and Lobbying 5
to ours is Acemoglu and Robinson (2001). There, a politician can pay income subsidies which
are targeted either to old or to all members of an industry. The targeted transfer is more
efficient in their model since it gives no incentives for young agents to enter into the subsidized
profession. However the non targeted subsidy program might still be preferred by the old
members if the size of the industry is an asset in the political sphere. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001) assume that the industry gains power and effectively sets policy in all future periods
if the number of agents working in that industry exceeds some threshold. Our paper departs
from theirs in two important aspects. First the inefficient policy changes the preferences of
future policy makers and not their identity.10 Second, and more importantly, we explicitly
model the determination of equilibrium policy by applying a menu auction lobbying game.
This is attractive as interest groups usually try to influence policy makers but do not have
political decision rights, and it helps us to identify the trade-offs a politician faces when he
sets policy. This formulation also contributes to a better understanding of an unappealing
property of menu auction lobbying games. The existing literature found that in the presence
of multiple lobbies there is a strong tendency to efficient policies. This however benefits the
politician only, since in the case of competing interest groups each lobby is held down to its
reservation utility.11 This prisoners dilemma type of situation seems to be somewhat at odds
with the sharply raising number of political action committees and interest groups in the
US, as in theory each lobby loses nothing by unilaterally abandoning its influence activities.
Therefore the theoretical result raises some concern about why lobbies manage to organize in
the first place. In response to these problems, Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997) resort
to the informal argument that interest groups obey to some agreed - upon “constitution”
specifying that all organized groups are only allowed to lobby for inefficient transfers, in
which case lobbies are able to expropriate some positive rent.
The extension of our model to the case of multiple lobbies reveals that in our dynamic setting,
first, inefficient policies still can prevail, and second, lobbies earn positive rents. To obtain
these results we do not need to assume some exogenously given coordination device, be it an
explicit contract or a repeated game setting. It is also noteworthy that competition between
interest groups can make the implemented policy even more inefficient.
10Other papers which examine the impact of a policy on the identity of future governments in different contexts
are Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994), Besley and Coate (1998) and Aghion and Bolton (1990).
11See Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit (1996) and Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997).
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out the model and discusses the
basic assumptions. Subsequently we will analyze the simplest version of the model where
only one interest group is active in the political arena. The forth section investigates the
impact of multiple lobbies and the last section concludes.
1.2 The Model
In the first part of this section I present the structure of the model, while the following
subsection is devoted to the discussion.
1.2.1 Description of the Model
We consider a small open economy which is populated by a unit measure of individuals with
different factor endowments.12 All individuals have the same utility function defined over
n + 1 goods (x0, x1, . . . , xn)
u = x0 +
n∑
i=1
ui(xi),
where x0 serves as a numeraire good with price equal to one and the functions ui(·) are
increasing, strictly differentiable and concave. Assuming that the income of all individuals is
high enough and the price for good xi equals pi the demand for good i is given by the inverse
of u′(xi) and is denoted by di(pi). For an individual endowed with income m this gives rise
to the indirect utility function V0 = m+S(p), where p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) is the world market
price vector the consumer faces and S(p) =
∑n
i=1 ui(di(pi))−
∑n
i=1 pidi(pi) denotes consumer
surplus.
It is assumed that the numeraire good x0 is produced competitively by labor alone with a
constant returns to scale technology. The input - output coefficient is set equal to one which
implies that the labor market will clear at a wage of one. The nonnumeraire goods xi are
produced by labor and a sector specific input with a constant returns to scale technology.
The sector specific input is supplied inelastically and its reward is denoted by πi(pi). It is
assumed that the specific input can not be traded (one could think of human capital, for
12The model largely follows Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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example).13
A fraction (mass) 1−ϕ of the population is only endowed with labor z alone, while a fraction
ϕi,
∑n
i=1 ϕi ≡ ϕ additionally owns the sector specific input for good i. Hence the income of
the owners of labor alone is given by one (the wage rate in the economy) while the owners of
the sector specific input derive additional income of πi(pi).
Some sectors i ∈ L are organized as lobbies. Only organized sectors can try to bribe the
politician in order to get a transfer, which can take two different forms: a lump sum transfer
denoted by ei or an output subsidy ti. Note that the output subsidy has no impact on prices
in the economy, hence all consumers face world market prices. Total transfers T (e, t) =∑n
i=1[ei + tiyi(pi + ti)] are financed equally by all members of the economy where yi(pi + ti) =
π′i(pi + ti) denotes the equilibrium supply of good i. We denote by Ti(ei, ti) the transfer to
lobby i. It is assumed that the lobby maximizes the welfare of its members.
Redistributing money causes a welfare loss to the society which is expressed by φ(
∑n
i=1[ei +
tiyi(pi + ti)]), where φ(·) is strictly increasing and convex with φ(0) = φ′(0) = 0.
Therefore the welfare of the workers consists of their consumer surplus minus the share of
the transfer and the redistribution cost they have to bear and can be expressed as
W0 = (1 − ϕ)
[
m + S(p) −
n∑
i=1
Ti(ei, ti) − φ
(
n∑
i=1
Ti(ei, ti)
)]
. (1.1)
Note that both transfers enter the welfare of workers only through the cost function φ(·)
and the share workers have to contribute to transfer expenditure but leave consumer surplus
unaffected.
The welfare of the owners of the specific input gross of contributions (see below) to the
politician in turn can be written as
Wi = πi(pi + ti) + ϕi
[
m + S(p) −
n∑
i=1
Ti(ei, ti) − φ
(
n∑
i=1
Ti(ei, ti)
)]
. (1.2)
Total welfare is simply given by the sum of the welfare levels of workers and the owners of
the sector specific inputs
W = W0 +
n∑
i=1
Wi = m + S(p) −
n∑
i=1
Ti(ei, ti) − φ
(
n∑
i=1
Ti(ei, ti)
)
+
n∑
i
πi(pi + ti).
As is standard in the literature, the lobbying process is modeled as a menu auction, i.e.
13This so called specific factor model is often used in the theory of international trade. It goes back to Jones
(1965), Mussa (1974), and Neary (1978).
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for every policy vector q = ({ei}i∈L, {ti}i∈L) each lobby offers a contribution Ci(q). The
policy q is set by a politician whose preferences are dependent on both aggregate welfare
and contributions from the lobbies. We follow the literature in that both components enter
linearly into the governments objective function such that
G = aW(q) +
∑
i∈L
Ci(q), (1.3)
where a ∈ R+o is the weight the politician attaches to social welfare.
The model we consider has two periods, τ = 1, 2. In every period, each lobby first offers
a contribution schedule. After that the politician chooses a policy q1 which maximizes
his utility given the contribution schedules. Then each sector decides on its production
and therefore on the optimal amount of inputs employed. It is assumed that the industry
represented by the lobby chooses the optimal amount of inputs in every period. At the end
of the first period production takes place and payoffs are realized.
The second period is identical to the first one except that we assume that a new politician is
in power who has the same objective function as his predecessor. Again the organized sectors
lobby, followed by the implementation of the preferred policy by the politician. However if
any sector chooses to adjust its production level we assume that every worker who changes
job incurs a loss of ϑ. After this adjustment has taken place firms produce and payoffs are
realized. For simplicity we assume no discounting. The timing of the model is summarized
in figure 1.
1.2.2 Discussion
This subsection is devoted to the discussion of the model.
First of all we restricted the set of policy instruments available to the politician. The transfer
e can be seen as an efficient mean of redistribution while the price subsidy t leads to distortions
in the product market and is therefore less efficient. This structure is similar to Dixit,
Grossman, and Helpman (1997) where the policy instruments are also exogenously given.
What is really important in my model for the two means of redistribution is that first they
can be ranked by how efficiently they transfer resources to the lobby, and second that the
more inefficient instrument leads to an expansion of production. Since this is true for almost
Political Insulation and Lobbying 9
τ = 1 
Politician
sets q1
Sectors
hire z1
Production,
payoffs
τ = 2
New politician
in power
Firms offer
C2i (q
2)
Politician
sets q2
Input ad-
justment
Production,
payoffs
Firms offer
C1i (q
1)
Figure 1.1: Timing
all observed inefficient transfers be it a cost or price subsidy or tariffs, changing the set of
policy instruments would have no impact on the qualitative results.
The second point concerns the modeling of the lobbying process. For lobbying to be effective
the politician must care sufficiently about contributions. This has been justified by assuming
that the politician can either use the contributions for personal consumption or to finance
his next electoral campaign.14 Reelection concerns are also one interpretation of why social
welfare enters into the objective function of the politician. Note that in my model the
politician will be voted out of office or resign after the first period for sure. One possible
justification, besides that the politician consumes the bribes, is that the incumbent is a
member of a party which is in need of resources for the next campaign. It is often argued
that one of the main roles of political parties is to discipline the leader and this would also
explain why the incumbent still cares about social welfare.
As we will see later in the analysis, extracting more bribes from the interest groups today
goes along with less bribes to be received in the future. In the model we assume that the
politician acts purely myopically, i.e. his preferences are defined over present payments from
the interest groups only. This assumption simplifies the analysis a lot but one might argue
that his fellow party members will also care about bribes in the future. However, it seems
14See Grossman and Helpman (1996) for a model in which the reelection probability increases with the amount
of resources spent in the campaign.
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plausible to argue that at least a part of future bribes flow to a different party (almost any
model of electoral competition has it that each competitor wins the election only with a
certain probability). Besides, in the case where the present government is in power in the
next period for sure and has a relatively high discount factor the argument of the paper goes
through.
As mentioned above, the lobbying process itself is modeled as a menu auction. This approach
goes back to Bernheim and Whinston (1986a,b).15 The basic idea of this approach is that
lobby groups tailor their contribution to the policy which is enacted by the politician. So
implicitly it is assumed that the lobby group can commit to pay the politician according
to the contribution schedule it has offered once the policy has been implemented. Besides
this strong assumption, the menu auction approach to lobbying has the advantage that it is
tractable, as it boils down to the politician maximizing a social welfare function in which the
organized groups gain additional weight.
A further issue concerns the assumption that workers who change job in the second period
lose some amount ϑ. There are different interpretations possible. One could either assume
that there is learning on the job and so a worker who is dismissed looses some part of his
human capital. Another interpretation would be that ϑ simply measures the cost the worker
has to incur to find a new job or that the worker stays unemployed for a short period and ϑ
measures the difference between his wage and unemployment benefits.
Note that the only way to lose a job is to work in an organized sector and one might argue
that workers have to be compensated for the risk they take. This would not allow us to fix
the wage rate in the economy at one. However, as will become clear later on in the analysis,
in equilibrium it never happens that workers are fired. That is also the reason why the labor
market clearing conditions are neglected in the analysis.
I have assumed that the industry hires the efficient amount of labor in every period. This
myopic behavior neglects possible dynamic considerations. It might be optimal for the indus-
try to hire more than the efficient amount of labor in the first period to change the behavior
of the politician later on. Although this might be in the interest of the industry as a whole it
15A very good overview about the theory of menu auctions and its application in the field of political economy
can be found in Grossman and Helpman (2001). See also Bergemann and Valimaki (2003) for an analysis
of dynamic common agency games.
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is nevertheless not optimal for a single firm belonging to the industry for standard free-riding
reasons. So implicit in this assumption is that the industry consists of many firms not able to
coordinate on some statically suboptimal capacity. This lack of coordination ability can be
justified in three ways: either a monitoring technology is missing or too costly or if contracts
on capacity can be written, by private information held by each individual firm about its
optimal capacity level. The information rents which have to be granted to all firms in this
latter case can render contractual arrangements too costly. Third it could also be the case
that capacity agreements are forbidden by the competition authorities.
To conclude this section I will give a short justification for the function φ(·) which measures
some social cost of transferring money to the organized groups. The first reason is purely
technical. In the absence of any redistribution costs the lobbies would extract money from the
rest of the society until the marginal utility of income of the individuals exceeds one.16 This
however makes it impossible to measure the indirect utility of the individuals in monetary
terms anymore, which in turn makes the aggregation of individual utility values and profits
accruing from the specific production factor in a social welfare function more difficult. But
there are also economic reasons to incorporate redistribution costs. Note that as the model
stands we have assumed lump sum taxation. The function φ(·) could measure the deadweight
loss accruing to society in case distorting taxes must be resorted to. Alternatively, it could
be interpreted as the administrative cost of collecting taxes and redistributing the revenue
to interest groups. One could argue that catering too much to special interests decreases the
reelection probability of the politician and therefore the value of his objective function.
1.3 Analysis with a Single Lobby
In this section we analyze the model in the presence of only one organized sector.17 To save
on notation we make the additional assumption that ownership is highly concentrated, so
ϕi = 0.
16That means that the numeraire good is no longer consumed in equilibrium.
17In this section we shall drop the subscript i to indicate variables which are related to the organized group
and will simply write e, t and T (e, t) for e1, t1 and T1(e1, t1).
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1.3.1 Preliminaries
Before we start the analysis in which one sector is organized let us take a look at the bench-
mark case in which no lobbying occurs. In this case the politician maximizes W over e and t.
Of course no transfers will be paid since by employing one of the two transfers social welfare
is reduced by the positive cost of redistribution. Formally this can be seen by looking at the
following derivatives18
∂W
∂e
= −aφ′(T (e, t)) ≤ 0,
∂W
∂t
= −aty′(p + t) − aφ′(T (e, t))T ′(e, t)
= −aty′(p + t) − aφ′(T (e, t))(y(p + t) + ty′(p + t)) ≤ 0.
Both expressions are obviously smaller than zero if e or t are positive. The second equation
also reveals that the output subsidy is a less efficient transfer instrument compared to the
lump sum payment. When e is marginally increased by one unit the firm’s profit rises by
the same amount while increasing profits by one unit using the output subsidy costs more.
Formally, dπ(p + t) = y(p + t)dt, so the output subsidy must increase by 1/[y(p + t)] units
in order to transfer one additional unit of profit to the firm. But society bears costs of
dT = y(p+ t)dt+ ty′(p+ t)dt which, after inserting the expression for dt, yields dT = 1+ εy,t,
where εy,t > 0 is the elasticity of supply with respect to the transfer. So part of the transfer
is lost since the industry expands output. This effect is stronger the steeper the supply curve
is, i.e. the stronger supply reacts to the output subsidy.
I now turn to the case where there exists one organized group which can pay a contribution
C(q) if the politician implements a policy q. As shown by Bernheim and Whinston (1986b)
an equilibrium of the menu auction game can be characterized as follows:
Definition 1.1 {C∗(q),q∗} constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the menu auction game if
and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) q∗ is feasible.
2) q∗ ∈ arg maxq aW(q) + C∗(q)
3) q∗ ∈ arg maxq W1(q) + aW(q)
4) ∃q′, q′ ∈ argmaxq aW(q) + C∗(q), such that C(q′) = 0.
18See the appendix for the derivation.
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The interpretation of the second condition is that the politician responds optimally to the
contribution scheme. The third condition stipulates that the optimal policy maximizes joint
welfare of the lobby group and the politician. This is not surprising as the lobby can transfer
utility to the politician without further cost. It is the last point which may be more difficult
to understand. It states that given the equilibrium contribution schedule the politician is
just indifferent between choosing the equilibrium policy q∗ and receiving C∗(q) or choosing
some other policy q′ and collecting no contributions. The meaning of this condition becomes
more apparent if we state it in the context of our model. Here q′ = 0 is the policy the
government would choose in the absence of any lobbies and hence with no contributions.
Then condition 4 says that the lobby induces the equilibrium policy q∗ at minimum cost as
the politician is just indifferent between taking the money and implementing the equilibrium
policy or neglecting the contributions of the organized group and maximizing social welfare.
In the analysis below, condition 3 will be used to determine the equilibrium policy vector
while the last condition pins down the contribution levels of the lobbies.
So far the solution to the menu auction game still seems to be complicated since one has
to maximize over a set of functions to find the lobby’s optimal strategy. Fortunately one
can simplify the problem considerably by focusing without loss of generality on a subset
of feasible strategies for the interest group, namely so called truthful strategies. Assuming
differentiability of the welfare and the contribution functions19 note first that the second and
third condition together imply local truthfulness in the sense that around the equilibrium
point ∇C∗(q) = ∇W1(q). Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) show that one can go even a
step further and restrict the lobby’s strategy set to globally truthful contribution schedules
without loss of generality. They show that each lobby’s best response set contains a truthful
strategy regardless of the strategies employed by other players. Furthermore, only truthful
contribution schedules are immune to pre-play communication in the presence of multiple
lobbies and are hence coalition proof. We will therefore restrict attention to these focal
strategies in the analysis to come and assume that the contribution schedule of the lobby
takes the truthful form
CT1 (q, b) = max{0,W1(q) − b1},
19Grossman and Helpman (1994) argue that differentiability of the contribution function is reasonable since
the equilibrium does not change too much if one of the players makes small mistakes.
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where b1 is some number chosen by the interest group and denotes the rent the lobby extracts
from bribing the policy maker. Note that this simplifies the problem considerably since now
one only has to solve for the optimal b1 to find the equilibrium contribution. Hence the
contribution function can be obtained by maximizing over a set of numbers and not over a
set of functions anymore.
The restriction to globally truthful contribution also makes immediately clear that the equi-
librium policy q∗ maximizes the joint welfare of the politician and the lobby. Assuming an
interior solution
q∗ ∈ argmax
q
aW(q) + C1(q) = aW(q) + W1(q) = aW0(q) + (1 + a)W1(q)
has to hold. So as already mentioned above the lobbying process leads the politician to
maximize a social welfare function in which the lobby gains an additional weight of 1.
1.3.2 The Static Game
We start the analysis with the simple case in which the game ends after the first period. As
we have shown above the problem can be solved by maximizing a social welfare function in
which the interest group has an increased weight. Specifically, this welfare function can be
written as
G = aW0(q) + (1 + a)W1(q)
= a[m + S(p(t)) − T (e, t) − φ(T (e, t))] + (1 + a)[π(p(t) + t) + e]. (1.4)
The maximization of this function yields the equilibrium policy, while the contribution func-
tion the lobby offers is obtained by employing the notion of a truthful strategy and choosing
b in a way such that the politician is exactly indifferent between a world where the interest
group is active and one where it is not. In the following proposition we summarize the result
of the static game:
Proposition 1.1 The equilibrium policy of the static game is given by t∗ = 0 and e∗ implic-
itly defined by 1 = aφ′(e∗).
The lobby offers the following contribution schedule: CT ∗ = e − e∗ + aφ(e∗).
Proof: See the appendix.
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This result is reminiscent of Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997) as the (more) inefficient
transfer instrument is not used in equilibrium. To understand this result remember that
the lobby and the politician maximize their joint welfare in equilibrium. Hence, the output
subsidy is not used as it leads to a loss of resources. Turning to the contribution function,
note that the lobby reimburses the politician exactly for the loss in social welfare it induces
by influencing the policy choice. Evaluating CT ∗ at the point e∗ immediately reveals that the
policy maker gets exactly aφ(e∗) as a contribution and so is exactly indifferent between setting
e = 0 (which is his default policy choice in the absence of a lobby group) and implementing e∗.
Note therefore that the politician gains nothing if only one interest group is active, since he
is precisely held down to his reservation utility and the lobby captures all the surplus which
is generated by the lobbying process. This is a very important property of menu auctions,
as we will see again later in the analysis. Each lobby’s rent is determined by the amount the
interest group adds to the joint surplus of the politician and the lobby by becoming active
and bribing the policy maker. That e∗ − aφ(e∗) corresponds to the added joint surplus can
easily be seen. Without the lobby, the politician sets q = 0 and the joint surplus is given
by aW(e = 0, t = 0). With an active lobby the optimal policy increases joint welfare by e∗
as the lobby gets an additional weight of 1, but welfare is reduced by the redistribution cost
aφ(e∗). The added joint surplus is of course larger if the politician cares less about society’s
well-being as measured by a decrease in the parameter a.
1.3.3 The Two Period Model
The Final Period
As shown by Bergemann and Valimaki (2003), the same techniques as developed by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986a,b) can be applied to solve dynamic menu auction games. The aim of
this section is to show how the second period output subsidy t2 depends on first period policy,
especially on the subsidy t1 granted in τ = 1.
We proceed by backward induction and begin our analysis in the second period. Assume that
the politician in period 1 has implemented a policy q1 = (t1, e1) which leads the organized
Political Insulation and Lobbying 16
industry to employ an amount z1(p + t1) of labor.20 When the second period politician has
to decide about the policy q2, he now also takes into account that a price subsidy in period
2 which is different from t1 leads to a welfare loss. This is due to the fact that the firm
responds optimally to equilibrium prices and adjusts the amount of labor employed. Since
all workers who have to change their job lose an amount ϑ of income, welfare in the second
period is given by
W = W0 + W1
= m + S[p] − T (e2, t2)− δϑ [z1(p + t1) − z2(p + t2)]− φ [T (e2, t2)]+ π [p(t2) + t2]+ e2.
δ is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t1 ≥ t2 and −1 otherwise. It is obvious that the
second period politician will never choose a policy which implements a higher price subsidy
than the one already in place. In the following analysis we will assume that t1 is large enough,
postponing the exact characterization of t1 until the period 1 lobbying game is examined.
Hence, all values derived in this section are properly interpreted as maximum values given
that the output subsidy in the first period was at least as large. Since the maximization
problem is the same as in the static case, the policy maker will not use the efficient transfer
e2 in the absence of an organized lobby group. However, given that a positive price subsidy
has been implemented in the first period, the politician has an incentive to at least partially
sustain the policy. This can be seen by examining the first order condition of W with respect
to t2:
∂W
∂t2
= a
[−ty′(p + t2) − φ′[T (e, t)] [y(p + t2) + ty′(p + t2)]+ ϑz′2(p + t2)] = 0.
Under the assumption that W is a concave function, the equation above has a unique solution
t−1 > 0. It is important to note that this solution depends on the price subsidy in period one
t1 only insofar as t−1 must be smaller than t1. If this were not the case, the policy maker
would create reallocation of workers instead of avoiding it. Formally, δ would turn negative
and one would have to subtract ϑz′2(t2)[p + t2] in the first order condition above and the
whole expression would be negative except at t−1 = 0. So t−1 denotes the maximal value of
the output subsidy in the second period under the assumption that the subsidy in the first
period was at least as large.
20Remember that throughout the analysis, subscripts denote the lobby group while superscripts stand for the
time period.
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The solution t−1 will obviously be larger the smaller φ′(·) and y′(p + t) are, i.e. the smaller
the cost of transferring money to the lobby via the output subsidy.
As in the static case, when deciding over the policy the politician maximizes the following
expression:
G2 = aW + W1
= a
[
m + S[p(t2)] − T (e2, t2) − ϑ [z1[p + t1] − z2[p + t2]]− φ[T (e2, t2)]]
+(1 + a)
[
π[p + t2] + e2
]
Assumption 1.1 G2 is quasiconcave in t2 and exhibits an interior maximum with respect to
e2.
This assumption is necessary since G2 depends on t2 in two ways: first, increasing t2 leads
to a welfare loss lowering G2 and this loss is the larger the larger t2. On the positive side is
that increasing t2 saves reallocation costs. This positive effect depends on the labor demand
function which normally is convex. Hence we subtract a convex function from a convex
function and the assumption makes sure that the welfare loss dominates, leading to a well-
behaved objective function. The interior solution with respect to e2 is guaranteed if the
redistribution cost function φ(·) is not too convex and simplifies the analysis considerably.
We will now provide the solution to the lobbying game in the second period.
Lemma 1.1 Let t̂2 be the solution to the following equation:
−(1 + a) (t2y′[p + t2])+ aϑz′(t2) = 0.
In the second period the politician will implement q2∗ = (e2∗, t2∗), where t2∗ = min{t1, t̂2}
and e2∗ solves aφ′[T (e2∗, t2∗)] = 1.
Proof: See the appendix.
The interpretation of this lemma is as follows. First, given that e2 > 0 in equilibrium, the
lobby will extract resources from the policy maker until its marginal benefit equals marginal
redistribution cost. t2 is characterized by a joint optimality condition of the politician and the
interest group. Note that t̂2 is the maximal sustainable output subsidy in the second period.
The equilibrium transfer will be smaller than t̂2 whenever the subsidy implemented in the
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first period is smaller. This is an important property of the model. When the lobby tries to
increase the output subsidy in the first period it automatically increases the second period
subsidy by the same amount (so t2 as a function of t1 is the identity function). From this
reasoning, one can immediately deduce why no worker reallocation takes place in equilibrium.
The First Period
The above analysis was carried out under the assumption that the price subsidy implemented
in the first period is positive. This must be the case in order for the equilibrium policy in
the second period to entail a positive subsidy. We will now show that in the first period the
interest group can decide between two options. First, by trying to receive the subsidy, which
comes at a cost in the current period, since part of the transfer which must be paid is lost
but increases the rent which can be captured in the second period. Or secondly, by lobbying
solely for the efficient transfer, which has no effect on the future.
In order to determine the equilibrium policy of the game we therefore have to investigate first
how the rent in the second period varies dependent on the price subsidy in the first period.
We start with an important lemma.
Lemma 1.2 The optimal price subsidy in the first period t1∗ is equal to t2∗.
The proof is obvious and therefore we will only give the intuition for the result. We have
already established in the last section that the politician in the second period will never
increase the level of the price subsidy, hence t2∗ ≤ t1∗. Now assume that the price subsidy
in the first period strictly exceeds the one in the second, i.e. t1∗ > t̂2. Then the interest
group and the politician can improve on their joint welfare by reducing the price subsidy in
the first period and using the efficient transfer instead. By doing this the rent of the lobby
in the second period remains unchanged (since t2∗ does not change) but the joint welfare in
the first period increases as distortions on the product market are avoided.
We are now in the position to examine the rent the lobby receives in the second period
depending on the subsidy in the first one. Again, the politician is exactly indifferent be-
tween receiving payments from the interest group and implementing his preferred policy and
neglecting contributions altogether. Note that the default policy the politician chooses in
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absence of the lobby is given by e2 = 0 and t−1. Since it is a priori not clear whether t−1 is
smaller or larger than t2∗ one has to distinguish between two cases.
First consider the case where t−1 > t2
∗. Since t2∗ and e2∗ are implemented in equilibrium
the rent b2 for the lobby is given by the following condition.21
aW(t2∗) = aW(t2∗, e2∗) + C2(e2∗, t2∗)
⇐⇒
aW(t2∗) = aW(t2∗, e2∗) + π(p + t2∗) + e2∗ − b2
Beside the redistribution cost, the welfare of the society is the same. Defining T̄ as the
equilibrium amount of transfers society has to pay with aφ′(T̄ ) = 1, we can write b2 as
follows:
b2 = a
[
φ(t2∗y(p + t2∗)) − φ(T̄ )
]
+ π(p + t2∗) + e2∗ (1.5)
Now it is important to remember that t2 and t1 vary exactly together in equilibrium as long
as t1 is smaller than t̂2, the maximum output subsidy in the second period. Therefore, one
could write b2 as a function of t1 as well by replacing t2∗ with t1. In what follows it will be
convenient to think of b2 as directly controlled by the choice of the subsidy in the first period.
One can immediately see that inducing a positive subsidy in the first period might be bene-
ficial for the lobby since it does not have to compensate the policy maker for the full amount
of redistribution costs anymore. However, note also that implementing the price subsidy
causes a subtle cost for the lobby. Since the sum of transfers to the lobby is bounded by the
redistribution cost function at T̄ , the amount of the lump sum transfer in period 1 shrinks
whenever the output subsidy is positive, i.e. e2∗ = T̄ − t2∗y(p + t2∗). In the following lemma
we will show that this latter effect dominates whenever t−1 > t2
∗.
Lemma 1.3 If t−1 > t2
∗ the interest group will only lobby for the efficient transfer e.
Proof: See the appendix.
The intuition behind this result is that for t−1 > t2
∗ it is necessary that the cost of redistribu-
tion is very low. Hence the cost saving in the second period from inducing the output subsidy
21Remember that given t2
∗
it is optimal to have t1
∗
= t2
∗
. But that means that the politicians default policy
is also t1
∗
and not t−1 anymore!
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in the first period is rather low and the interest group prefers the efficient transfer.22 Thus,
the result makes clear that a politician who puts only little weight on welfare and caters a
lot to interest groups (i.e. a politician with a small value of a) has an ambiguous effect on
welfare: on the one hand total transfers increase but on the other hand, the more efficient
transfer instrument is used.
Let us now turn to the second case where t−1 < t2
∗. Here, the contributions of the interest
group make it optimal for the politician to increase the subsidy beyond his default policy.
To examine the incentives of the lobby to receive such a transfer scheme, we again have to
investigate how the rent in the second period depends on the subsidy in the first one. The
rent of the lobby is calculated in the usual manner by compensating the politician exactly
for the change in welfare induced by the lobbying process. Specifically, the rent b2 can be
obtained from the following equation:
aW(t−1) − aϑ[z1(t1) − z2(t−1)] = aW(t2∗, e2∗) + π(p + t2∗) + e2∗ − b2.
Note that no cost stemming from worker reallocation accrues in equilibrium since t1∗ = t2∗.
We can rewrite the above expression to obtain
b2 = a[W(t2∗, e2∗) −W(t−1)] + aϑ[z1(t2∗) − z2(t−1)] + π(p + t2∗) + e2∗,
which after inserting e2∗ = T̄ − t2∗y(p + t2∗) can be rearranged to
b2 = (1 + a)
[
π(p + t2∗) − t2∗y(p + t2∗)
]
+ a [t−1y(p + t−1) − π(p + t−1)]
−a[φ(T̄ ) − φ(t−1y(p + t−1))] + aϑ
[
z1(t2∗) − z2(t−1)
]
+ T̄ (1.6)
From the formula one can see two channels by which it might be beneficial for the lobby to
induce a positive price subsidy in the first period. The second and the third term indicate
that the interest group does not have to compensate the politician for the full welfare cost but
only for the difference between the cost the politician would have been willing to incur in case
of no active lobby group and the equilibrium cost. Hence, the interest group reimburses the
policy maker just for the difference in redistribution cost and the difference in the deadweight
22This point can most easily be seen by looking at the extreme case where total transfers are bounded by T̄
but no further redistribution costs accrue. In this case b2 = π(p+ t2
∗
)+ e2
∗
= T̄ − t2∗y(p+ t2∗)+π(p+ t2∗)
and one can immediately see that setting t2
∗
equal to zero is optimal. The reason is that the lobby does not
have to compensate the politician for any redistribution costs and therefore gets transfers for free.
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loss which is associated with the inefficient transfer. The second channel, given by the last
term, concerns worker reallocation. Since, in the absence of the lobby, the policy maker would
tolerate some reallocation, the reservation utility of the politician goes down. This results in
less compensation necessary to guarantee the politician’s participation. This effect becomes
stronger the further t1 is expanded beyond t−1.
However the first term in the above expression is an opposite force. Note that this term
denotes the difference between what society has to pay for a given level of output subsidy
and how much additional profit the output subsidy generates. Since the subsidy leads to an
inefficient output expansion of the industry part of the resources spent is lost. This negative
effect becomes stronger the higher the output subsidy is and will therefore limit the amount
of inefficient redistribution.
After we have characterized the rent in the second period depending on the first period’s
implemented policy, we can now turn to the policy choice in the first period. If the interest
group submits a truthful contribution schedule, it will not only take into account how a
certain policy choice affects current profits but also its impact on future payoffs. Clearly, the
efficient transfer e does not influence future rents while the output subsidy does. Hence, the
contribution schedule offered in the first period reflects both current and future profits:
C1(e1, t1) = e1 + π(p + t1) + b2(t1) − b1.
Again the chosen policy will be jointly optimal and maximizes
G1(e1, t1) = aW(e1, t1) + C1(e1, t1) (1.7)
over the two policy instruments e1 and t1.
The solution to this problem is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2 Given that t2∗ > t−1, the equilibrium subsidy t1
∗ = t2∗ is implicitly defined
by the following equation:
−2(1 + a)t1∗y′(p + t1∗) + aϑz′(p + t1∗) = 0.
The lump sum transfer e1∗ is given by aφ′[e1∗ + t1∗y(p + t1∗)] = 1.
The interest group offers the contribution schedule
C1(e1, t1) = e1 + π(p + t1) − a[W(t1∗, e1∗) −W(0, 0)] − π(p + t1∗) − e1∗.
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Proof: See the appendix.
As the labor demand function z(p + t) is strictly increasing whenever y′(·) 
= 0, the output
subsidy will be positive in equilibrium. Therefore, we have established that the inefficient
transfer is used despite the fact that an efficient redistribution device is available. The
intuition for this result can be derived from our discussion of the rent b2. It is shown in
the appendix that if the interest group expands the output subsidy beyond t−1 the marginal
change in the rent is given by
∂b2
∂t1
∣∣∣∣
t1≥t−1
= −(1 + a)t1y′(p + t1) + aϑz′(p + t1).
The interest group thus faces two effects. The first effect is negative and measures the loss
of resources the output subsidy entails. This loss accrues both to society (and is therefore
weighted with a) and to the lobby which forgoes some amount of the transfer.23
But as mentioned above, a positive subsidy in the first period leads to overcapacities in the
industry and makes the politician reluctant to cut back the transfer in the second period.
In the case we consider where t−1 < t2
∗, the parameters are such that the policy maker is
nevertheless willing to tolerate some amount of worker reallocation in the absence of a lobby.
However, this decreases his reservation utility and for this reason the interest group has to
pay less compensation. Thus, as t1 is increased beyond t−1, the interest group gains exactly
the additional welfare loss which would be inflicted on society if the lobby was absent in the
second period.
The comparative statics of the equilibrium output subsidy are straightforwardly calculated.
As one would expect, the subsidy is increasing in ϑ, the welfare cost of worker reallocation.
A more surprising effect is obtained when considering the parameter a. As the sign of ∂t
1∗
∂a is
the same as the derivative of the equilibrium condition for t1∗ stated in the proposition, we
have
sign
[
∂t1
∗
∂a
]
= sign
[
−2t1∗y′(p + t1∗) + ϑz′(p + t1∗)
]
> 0.
23Remember that the total sum of transfers society has to pay for is fixed at T̄ . If the politician wants
to transfer some fixed amount of money to the interest group by using the subsidy the deadweight loss
associated with this transfer results in a higher payment for the society. That means that the interest group
can extract only a smaller amount of the lump sum transfer. It is for this reason that the loss of resources
is additionally weighted with 1.
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The last expression is positive at the equilibrium value since the first (negative) term is
weighted less while the second positive term is weighted more compared to the equilibrium
condition. Thus ceteris paribus politicians who care more about social welfare will implement
a higher output subsidy. The explanation for this phenomenon is simple: a higher value of
a means that the politician cares more about society’s wellbeing relative to interest group
profit. Hence, the policy maker is more willing to avoid reallocation cost and to tolerate
less industry profits. We subsume the comparative statics of the single lobby model in the
following corollary:
corollary 1.1 The implemented level of the price subsidy is increasing in reallocation cost
ϑ and the politician’s concern for social welfare a.
To understand the condition for the equilibrium value of the subsidy, note that the interest
group’s willingness to pay24 for it consists of two parts: the profit generated by it and the
future rent which can be obtained. Hence, when the lobby decides whether to pay for the
output subsidy, it takes into account the loss of resources entailed in the first period (which
is again given by (1 + a)t1y′(p + t1)). Adding up the first period loss and the change in the
second period’s rent yields the condition stated in the proposition.
Given the optimal value of the subsidy, the lump sum transfer e1 is expanded until the
marginal profit to the firm equals marginal redistribution cost. Once the equilibrium policy is
fixed, the contribution schedule can easily be obtained by employing the notion of truthfulness
and pushing the politician down to his reservation utility.
In summary, we have established that in a dynamic setting strategic considerations might
lead interest groups to lobby for an inefficient transfer. The key in the model is that the
preferences of succeeding politicians can be altered through an output subsidy. Specifically,
compensation for the second period’s policy maker can be lowered as sustaining the output
subsidy avoids social costs through worker dismissal.
24Remember that we are still considering an equilibrium in truthful strategies so the contribution schedule
offered just reflects willingness to pay.
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1.4 Multiple Lobbies
One cumbersome property of the menu auction approach to lobbying is the fact that with
two or more lobbies competition between organized groups gets extremely fierce. If one
considers a model with inefficient transfer instruments only, the result that the benefits from
lobbying activity go down is still intuitive. However if one allows for the availability of an
efficient transfer the rents lobbies can appropriate are immediately driven down to zero. To
see the point first note that in static settings only the most efficient redistribution device
is employed. Since the politician must still get his reservation utility each interest group
must design its contribution schedule in such a way that the policy maker is just indifferent
between catering to this interest group or disregarding it altogether. Put differently each
interest group must compensate the politician exactly for the joint welfare change of society
and all other lobby groups induced by the policy change. So if only the efficient redistribution
device is used, how does the utility of the politician change upon a new interest group entering
the political arena? Since the well-being of the society as a whole is not affected by lump sum
redistribution and the politician does not care which lobby gets the money, the utility of the
politician is unaffected by the entry of a new lobby. That means that the policy maker does
not lose anything if he disregards one lobby and caters instead to the other one(s), resulting
in a very strong bargaining position. Hence the competition between interest groups is of a
Bertrand type. By raising its contribution (i.e. lowering the rent) marginally over its rival
each lobby can appropriate all the funds which are available. Consequently interest groups
will raise their bids until their rent is zero.
This result raises two concerns: first only efficient redistribution takes place in equilibrium,
which can hardly be reconciled with reality. Second, each interest group has nothing to
gain from the lobbying process and would be as well off by unilaterally withdrawing its
contributions. It is important to note that this prisoners dilemma type of situation does not
occur if only inefficient transfer instruments are available. As inefficient redistribution causes
welfare costs for which the politician must be compensated, each lobby is less aggressive
leading to positive equilibrium rents. To save the plausibility of this type of model the extant
literature resorted to the following argument:25 since lobbies fare so poorly in equilibrium
they will ex-ante agree on a constitution specifying that interest group are allowed to lobby
25See Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997).
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only for inefficient transfers. Since it is unclear whether such a contract is enforceable before
a court the argument relies at least partially on a repeated game setting in the background.
This being said, it seems to be worthwhile to investigate whether competition between lobbies
has the same detrimental effect on interest group payoffs in our model.
Throughout we will stick to the same assumptions as in the monopolistic lobby case, except
that we now allow for a second organized sector.26 We will also assume that both industries
are completely symmetric and are characterized by the same production technology.
1.4.1 The Static Game
To illustrate the arguments outlined above we will start with the static case. The subscripts
1 and 2 denote the two lobbies.
In the presence of two lobbies which submit truthful contribution schedules the equilibrium
policy is determined by the maximization of the following function:
G(e1, e2, t1, t2) = aW + W1 + W2. (1.8)
As in the setting with only one lobby only the efficient transfer will be used.
Proposition 1.3 In equilibrium t∗1 = t∗2 = 0. The efficient transfers e∗1 and e∗2 are set such
that aφ′(e∗1 + e∗2) = 1.
Proof: See the appendix.
First note that the total amount of resources redistributed does not change compared to
the single lobby case. Since the cost of redistribution depends on the sum of transfers the
marginal payment to compensate the politician for the last unit of redistribution still equals
marginal benefit of the lobby and is therefore equal to one. The second property of the
equilibrium worth emphasizing is that although the total sum of transfers is fixed at T̄ it is
not clear how T̄ is distributed among the groups. This indeterminacy is due to the fact that
the policy maker is indifferent about the exact allocation of resources as long as only lump
sum payments are used. This leads us directly to the investigation of the equilibrium rents
26Since two lobbies are sufficient to drive rents down to zero in the extant literature this assumption seems
obvious. An extension to more than two lobbies has no impact on our core results (see section 4.2).
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b∗i , i = 1, 2.
As outlined before given b∗j the rent bi is determined such that the policy maker is indifferent
between disregarding lobby i’s contribution and just dealing with lobby j, j 
= i, and taking
both contributions into account and changing equilibrium policy accordingly. First of all we
need to determine which policy would have been chosen in the absence of one lobby. Since
only two industries are organized we can resort to the results of the previous section. Clearly,
each lobby would get an amount of T̄ of the efficient transfer. We denote the transfer to
lobby j in the absence of lobby i with ẽj . Formally the contribution schedule C1(e1, b∗1) of
lobby 1 must satisfy the following requirement:
aW(ẽ2) + C2(ẽ2, b∗2) = aW(e∗1, e∗2) + C2(e∗2, b∗2) + C1(e∗1, b∗1).
The left hand side is the payoff of the politician with just lobby 2 active while at the right
hand side both lobbies are active. Note first that the welfare of the society as a whole remains
unchanged since the sum of transfers is not altered. Moreover as ẽ2 = T̄ and e∗2 = T̄ − e∗1 we
can rewrite the above condition employing truthful strategies:
T̄ − b∗2 = T̄ − e∗1 − b∗2 + e∗1 − b∗1 ⇒ b∗1 = 0.
The problem for lobby 2 is exactly the same so we can conclude that both interest groups
derive no benefit from the lobbying process. Thus the static model replicates well known
results from the extant literature. Both lobbies bid for transfers which are available in fixed
total sum so competition drives their payoffs down to zero.
1.4.2 Analysis of the Dynamic Game
Again we proceed by backward induction and first analyze the second period. Total welfare
in the society is given by an expression analogous to the monopolistic case:
W = W0(e21, e22, t21, t22) + W1(e21, e22, t21, t22) + W2(e21, e22, t21, t22) =
m+S[p]−
∑
i=1,2
Ti(e2i , t
2
i )−
∑
i=1,2
δiϑ[z1i (p+t
1
i )−z2i (p+t2i )]−φ
⎡⎣∑
i=1,2
Ti(e2i , t
2
i )
⎤⎦+∑
i=1,2
{πi[p(t2i )+t2i ]+e2i }.
δi is an indicator variable which takes on the value 1 if t1i > t
2
i (resulting in a compression
of the amount of labor hired in industry i) and the value −1 otherwise. Some results of the
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single lobby case naturally carry over to the competitive case. Obviously the politician has no
incentive to increase the output subsidy beyond the level stipulated in the first period. Second
for the same reasons as in the monopolistic lobby case there will be no worker reallocation
in equilibrium or, put differently, the subsidy implemented in the first period will not exceed
the one in the second period.
As in the single lobby case we first investigate the maximal sustainable output subsidy in the
second period, neglecting the equilibrium level until we analyze the first period of the game.
For this we maximize the objective function of the politician
G2(e21, e
2
2, t
2
1, t
2
2) = aW(e21, e22, t21, t22) + W1(e21, e22, t21, t22) + W2(e21, e22, t21, t22)
we respect to the policy instruments. The following lemma comprises the results.
Lemma 1.4 Let t̂i be defined by
−(1 + a)t̂iy′(p + t̂i) + aϑz′i(t̂i) = 0, i = 1, 2.
Second period equilibrium policy is given by q2∗ = (t2i
∗
, e2i
∗)i=1,2 with t2i
∗ = min{t̂i, t1i } where
t1i denotes the output subsidy for industry i implemented in the first period.
The equilibrium lump sum transfers are determined by aφ′
(∑
i=1,2 Ti(t
2
i
∗
, e2i
∗)
)
= 1.
Proof: See the appendix.
The result is striking if one compares the condition for the maximal sustainable output
subsidy with the single lobby case. The expressions are equal, meaning that the presence of an
additional lobby does not alter the set of possible output subsidies which can be implemented
by the interest groups. Again, once the level of output subsidies is fixed the amount of the
efficient transfer to each lobby is obtained by equalizing marginal benefit with marginal
redistribution cost.
However for the determination of the policy vector actually chosen by the politician one
again has to look at the incentives to introduce the inefficient transfer in the first place.
As we know already from the analysis of the single lobby case the crucial factor is how the
second period equilibrium rent changes with t1i , the output subsidy implemented in the first
period. To obtain this rent we first have to derive the default policy which is implemented
in the absence of a lobby.27 Of course if an interest group is not active it will not receive the
27The following analysis is conducted for lobby 1, the problem for lobby 2 is exactly the same.
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efficient transfer. The level of the output subsidy instead is determined by the derivative of
G−1 = aW + W2 with respect to t21. It can be shown (see the appendix) that
∂G−1
∂t21
= −(1 + a)t21y′1(p + t21) − y1(p + t21) + aϑz′1(t21).
It is important to note that the maximizer of this derivative t−1 ≥ 0 is always smaller
compared to the monopolistic setting. Again we have to distinguish between two different
cases as in the single lobby case. If t−1 > t11
∗ there is no incentive for the interest group to
obtain the output subsidy. In what follows we focus exclusively on the more interesting case
where t−1 < t11
∗.
Knowing the default policy of the politician it is by now straightforward albeit somewhat
tedious to calculate the equilibrium rent of lobby 1.
Lemma 1.5 The equilibrium rent of lobby 1 in the second period b21
∗ is given by
b21
∗ = (1+a)
[
π(p + t21
∗) − t21∗y(p + t21∗)
]
+a[t−1y(p+t−1)−π(p+t−1)]+aϑ
[
z1(t21
∗) − z2(t−1)
]
.
Proof: See the appendix.
The first term measures the welfare loss associated with an output subsidy of t21
∗ which
is weighted with 1 + a, the weight attached to industry profits by the politician. This is
intuitive as the use of the output subsidy reduces the amount of additional profits which can
be shifted to the lobby. Both other terms are positive and well known from the discussion of
the equilibrium rent in the monopolistic lobby case. The first one displays how much of the
output subsidy and thus loss of resources the politician would have been willing to tolerate
in the absence of the interest group. The second one indicates the cost of worker reallocation
society would have to bear if group one was not active.
It might be surprising that this expression is very similar to the monopolistic case. Comparing
the formula above with equation (1.6) the first thing to note is that in the competitive case
the interest group does not have to compensate the politician for any redistribution cost.
This makes sense since in the monopolistic case the lobby had to reimburse the policy maker
for the additional redistribution cost caused by active lobbying. Here however, if lobby 1 is
not active all resources available for redistribution will flow to lobby 2 resulting in social cost
of aφ(T̄ ) anyway. Besides this the expressions for second period rents are identical but note
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that t−1 is smaller in the competitive case.
For the determination of equilibrium policy however the crucial factor is how b21
∗ behaves as
t11 and therefore t
2
1
∗ changes. Assuming that t−1 < t21
∗ the derivative of b21
∗ with respect to
t11 is given by
∂b21
∗
∂t11
= −(1 + a)t11y′1(p + t11) + aϑz′1(t11). (1.9)
Note that this expression is exactly identical to the monopolistic case. We are now able to
pin down the equilibrium policy vector.
Proposition 1.4 The equilibrium output subsidies t1i
∗
, i = 1, 2 are implicitly defined by
−2(1 + a)t1i ∗y′i(p + t1i ∗) + aϑz′i(p + t1i ∗) = 0.
The equilibrium lump sum transfers e1i
∗
, i = 1, 2 are given by aφ′
(∑
i=1,2 Ti(e
1
i
∗
, t1i
∗)
)
= 1.
Proof: See the appendix.
Hence competition between lobbies only affects the amount of the efficient transfer the interest
groups can appropriate. The level of the output subsidy does not change. The intuition for
this result is as follows. In the competitive case lobby 1 competes for transfers against lobby 2.
But in the monopolistic case the interest group also takes into account that if it increases the
output subsidy marginally, the amount of the efficient transfer it can appropriate goes down.
One can therefore say that the lobby competes against itself. Furthermore equilibrium policy
is characterized by a joint optimality condition and for the politician it makes no difference
which lobby suffers from a reduction in available transfers. Hence the willingness to pay for
the subsidy on the interest group’s side and the willingness to give on the politician’s side
remain unchanged.
Since the equilibrium condition does not change compared to the monopolistic case the same
interpretation and the same comparative statics apply. A more interesting point concerns
the comparison of social welfare. First of all remember that in the monopolistic case a
necessary condition for a positive output subsidy was that the second period policy maker
was sufficiently reluctant to transfer resources inefficiently. We stipulated that if the costs
of redistribution are too low it is optimal for the interest group to lobby for the efficient
transfer only. Intuitively, as the lobby gets any transfer almost costlessly it does not pay
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to waste resources in the first period to influence the preferences for redistribution of the
succeeding politician. This scenario happens in the competitive case only with a smaller
probability. Here the presence of another lobby makes it more costly to obtain transfers
since interest groups compete against each other. Hence more organized industries make
the political equilibrium more inefficient since political insulation of policies becomes more
attractive.
A second effect going in the same direction does not concern the probability that the output
subsidy is used but the total amount of inefficient redistribution. Since equilibrium subsidies
are the same for each lobby independently of the degree of competition, total waste in the
economy increases as the number of organized industries goes up. It is also straightforward
to see that if the number of active lobbies grows sufficiently large, all resources available for
redistribution will be exhausted by subsidy payments. Hence if a society exhibits a growing
number of organized special interests, lump sum transfers will no longer be observed in
equilibrium.
We can therefore state that more competition among lobbies leads to a more and more
inefficient political equilibrium.
1.5 Conclusion
The paper has developed a dynamic theory of inefficient redistribution to interest groups.
It did so by considering a two period game where in each period interest groups have the
possibility to bribe the politician in exchange for a favorable policy. As a main point we
have shown that inefficient transfers can occur in equilibrium and that competition between
interest groups is not effective in eliminating them but even makes things worse. The paper
therefore contributes to our understanding of the lobbying process.
However we have treated some aspects of the game as a black box. First we have an incom-
plete understanding of which industries manage to get organized and how possible incentive
problems within an interest group are overcome. Second politicians are hardly unitary actors
but are members of organizations which constrain their behavior. To our knowledge a more
explicit modeling of parties has not been embedded into the lobbying literature so far.28 A
28The role of political parties in general is only poorly understood so far. See Caillaud and Tirole (1999),
Caillaud and Tirole (2002) and Levy (2004b) for first steps in that direction.
Political Insulation and Lobbying 31
model of the inner workings of parties would also help us to give a more solid microfoundation
for the objective function generally assumed in the lobbying literature. For this point see
also the discussion in the second section of this paper. Finally instead of assuming that both
social welfare and received bribes increase the reelection probability one should incorporate
the voting behavior explicitly into the model. Coate (2004a,b) goes along these lines and finds
interesting results. More campaign spending does not automatically lead to better reelection
prospects as voters anticipate that generous support of the campaign by interest groups must
be paid back later in form of favorable policies. It is hence questionable whether more funds
translate into higher reelection probabilities.
All of these topics seem to be worth future investigation.
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1.6 Appendix
Derivation of
∂W
∂t
∂W
∂t
= a[−∂T
∂t
+
dπ
dt
− dφ
dT (e, t)
∂T
∂t
].
Using π′(·) = y(·) by Hotelling’s lemma we obtain
a[−y(p + t) − ty′(p(t) + t) + y(p + t) − φ′(T (e, t))T ′(e, t)]
Hence we get the desired result:
∂W
∂t
= a[−ty′(p + t) − φ′(T (e, t))T ′(e, t)]
‖
Proof of Proposition 1.1
The first order conditions can be written as
∂G
∂e
= 1 − aφ′(T (e, t)) = 0
∂G
∂t
= −aty′[p + t] + y[p + t] − aφ′(T (e, t))(y[p + t] + ty′[p + t])
Making use of the fact that in an optimum aφ′(T (e, t)) = 1 the second condition can be
written as
−(1 + a)ty′[p + t] < 0.
Hence t∗ = 0 and e∗ is defined by the first condition. To derive the equilibrium rent of the
lobby note that the politician must be just indifferent between paying e∗ to the lobby and
getting the contribution or neglecting the interest group. Hence
a[W(e = 0)] = a[W(e∗)] + CT ∗
⇔
a[W(e = 0)] = a[W(e∗)] + W1(e∗, t) − b
⇔
a[W(e = 0)] = a[W(e∗)] + e∗ − b
⇔
b∗ = e∗ − aφ(e∗)
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The contribution function stated in the proposition follows immediately. ‖
Proof of Lemma 1.1
Maximization of G2 leads to the following first order conditions:
∂G2
∂e2
= −aφ′(T (e2, t2)) + 1 = 0
∂G2
∂t2
= a{−t2y′[p + t2] + ϑz′2(t2)
−φ′(T (e2, t2))[t2y′[p + t2] + y[p + t2]]} + y[p + t2] = 0
Plugging in aφ′(T (e2, t2)) = 1 in the second equation yields
−(1 + a){t2y′[p + t2]} + aϑz′2(t2) = 0 (1.10)
‖
Proof of Lemma 1.2
We plug in e2∗ = T̄ − t2∗y(p + t2∗) in the formula for b2 and form the derivative with respect
to t2∗.
∂b2
∂t2∗
= aφ′(t2∗y(p + t2∗))
[
y(p + t2∗) + ty′(p + t2∗)
]
+ y(p + t2∗) − t2∗y′(p + t2∗) − y(p + t2∗)
= aφ′(t2∗y(p + t2∗))
[
y(p + t2∗) + ty′(p + t2∗)
]
− t2∗y′(p + t2∗).
Now if t−1 > t2
∗ it must be that ∂W∂t (t
2∗) > ∂G
2
∂t (t
2∗) and hence
a
[
−t2∗y′(p + t2∗) − φ′[T (e, t)][y(p + t2∗) + ty′(p + t2∗)] + ϑz′2(p + t2∗)
]
>
−(1 + a){t2∗y′[p + t2∗]} + aϑz′2(t2∗)
⇐⇒
t2
∗
y′(p + t2∗) > aφ′[T (e, t)][y(p + t2∗) + ty′(p + t2∗)].
Therefore b2 is decreasing at t2∗ and so it is optimal for the lobby to decrease t2. But since
among all positive output subsidies t2∗ is optimal the best the interest group can do is to set
t1 = t2 = 0. ‖
Proof of Proposition 1.2
First we have to derive b2 for the case t−1 < t1 which is given by
b2 = a[W(t2∗, e2∗) −W(t−1)] + aϑ[z1(t2∗) − z2(t−1)] + π(p + t2∗) + e2∗
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⇐⇒
b2 = a[−t2∗y(p + t2∗) + π(p + t2∗) + t−1y(p + t−1)− π(p + t−1)]− a[φ(T̄ )− φ(t−1y(p + t−1))]
+aϑ[z1(t2∗) − z2(t−1)] + π(p + t2∗) + e2∗.
Taking into account that e2∗ = T̄ − t2∗y(p + t2∗) this reduces to
(1 + a)[π(p + t2∗) − t2∗y(p + t2∗)] + a[t−1y(p + t−1) − π(p + t−1)]
−a[φ(T̄ ) − φ(t−1y(p + t−1))] + aϑ[z1(t2∗) − z2(t−1)] + T̄ .
We can now calculate the derivative of b2 with respect to t2∗.
∂b2
∂t2∗
∣∣∣∣
t1≥t−1
=
∂b2
∂t1
∣∣∣∣
t1≥t−1
− (1 + a)t1y′(p + t1) + aϑz′(p + t1).
Since t2∗ = t1, ∂b
2
∂t1
is the same as ∂b
2
∂t1
.
Having derived this the equilibrium policy is given by the maximization of
G(e1, t1) = aW(e1, t1) + C1(e1, t1) = aW(e1, t1) + e1 + π(p + t1) + b2(t1) − b1
The first order conditions are given by
∂G
∂e1
= −aφ′(T (e1, t1)) + 1 = 0
∂G
∂t1
= −aty′[p + t1] − aφ′(T (e1, t1))(y[p + t1] + ty′[p + t1]) + y[p + t1]
−(1 + a)t1y′(p + t1) + aϑz′(p + t1) = 0
Replacing the cost function aφ′(·) with 1 we obtain
−2(1 + a)ty′[p + t1] + aϑz′(p + t1).
‖
Proof of Lemma 1.3
The proof is almost identical to the single lobby case. Maximization of G(e1, e2, t1, t2) =
aW + W1 + W2 with respect to e1, e2, t1 and t2 yields the following first order conditions:
∂G
∂e1
=
∂G
∂e2
= aφ′
⎛⎝∑
i=1,2
Ti(ei, ti)
⎞⎠− 1 != 0
∂G
∂ti
= a
⎧⎨⎩−tiy′[p + ti] + −φ′
⎛⎝∑
i=1,2
Ti(ei, ti)
⎞⎠ [tiy′[p + ti] + y[p + ti]]
⎫⎬⎭+ y[p + ti] ≤ 0, i = 1, 2.
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Substituting for aφ′(·) yields
−(1 + a)tiy′[p + ti] < 0.
Hence t1 = t2 = 0. Plugging that into the first equation gives the equilibrium condition for
e1 and e2. ‖
Proof of Lemma 1.4
From maximization of G2(e21, e
2
2, t
2
1, t
2
2) we obtain the following first order conditions:
∂G2
∂e2i
= aφ′
⎛⎝∑
i=1,2
Ti(e2i , t
2
i )
⎞⎠− 1 != 0
∂G2
∂t2i
= a
⎧⎨⎩−t2i y′[p + t2i ] + −φ′
⎛⎝∑
i=1,2
Ti(e2i , t
2
i )
⎞⎠[t2i y′[p + t2i ] + y[p + t2i ]]+ ϑz′i(t2i )
⎫⎬⎭+ y[p + t2i ] = 0,
i = 1, 2.
Plugging in for aφ′(·) yields the condition stated in the lemma. ‖
Derivation of
∂G−1
∂t21
∂G−1
∂t21
= −a [t21y′(p + t21) − φ′ (T2(ẽ22, t̃22)+ t21) [y1(p + t21) + t21y′1(p + t21)]+ ϑz′1(t21)] ≤ 0,
t21 ≥ 0, t21 ·
∂G−1
∂t21
= 0.
Since lobby 2 is active aφ′(·) = 1 in equilibrium. Plugging in yields
∂G−1
∂t21
= −(1 + a)t21y′1(p + t21) − y1(p + t21) + aϑz′1(t21).
‖
Proof of Lemma 1.5
We will indicate the transfers to lobby 2 in the absence of lobby 1 with a tilde. b21
∗ is
characterized by the following equation
aW(ẽ22, t̃22, t−1) + C22 (ẽ22, t̃22, b22∗) != aW(e21∗, e22∗, t21∗, t22∗) + C22 (e22∗, t22∗, b22∗) + C21 (e21∗, t21∗, b21∗).
Observe that since the condition for t2i
∗ is the same in the competitive as in the monopolistic
case t̃22 = t
2
i
∗. Hence we have that
C22 (e
2
2
∗
, t22
∗
, b22
∗) − C22 (ẽ22, t̃22, b22∗) = e22∗ − ẽ22.
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Furthermore as the total sum of transfers is unaffected by the entry of the second lobby
redistribution costs remain unchanged. Thus
aW(e21∗, e22∗, t21∗, t22∗) − aW(ẽ22, t̃22, t−1) =
a
[
π1(p + t21
∗) − t21∗y1(p + t21∗) + t−1y1(p + t−1) − π1(p + t−1) + ϑ (z1(t21∗) − z1(t−1)
)]
Since C21 (·) is truthful we obtain
b21
∗ = a
[
π1(p + t21
∗) − t21∗y1(p + t21∗) + t−1y1(p + t−1) − π1(p + t−1)+
ϑ
(
z1(t21
∗) − z1(t−1)
)]
+ e22
∗ − ẽ22 + e21∗ + π1(p + t21∗).
The derivation of b21
∗ as stated in the lemma is complete if one sets ẽ22 = T̄ − t22∗y2(p + t22∗)
and e21
∗ = T̄ − t21∗y1(p + t21∗) − t22∗y2(p + t22∗) − e22∗. Substituting gives
b21
∗ = (1+a)
[
π(p + t21
∗) − t21∗y(p + t21∗)
]
+a[t−1y(p+t−1)−π(p+t−1)]+aϑ
[
z1(t21
∗) − z2(t−1)
]
.
‖
Proof of Proposition 1.4
The procedure should be standard by now. The equilibrium policy maximizes
G1 = aW(e11, e12, t11, t12) + C12 (e12, t12, b21) + C11 (e11, t11, b11).
Taking into account that the marginal contribution just reflects marginal willingness to pay
and considering the impact of a policy on both periods, i.e.
∂C1i
∂t1i
=
∂Wi
∂t1i
+
∂b2i
∂t1i
yield the following first order conditions:
∂G1
∂e1i
= −aφ′
⎛⎝∑
i=1,2
Ti(e1i , t
1
i )
⎞⎠+ 1 = 0, i = 1, 2.
∂G1
∂t1i
= −aφ′
⎛⎝∑
i=1,2
Ti(e1i , t
1
i )
⎞⎠ [yi(p + t1i ) + t1i y′i(p + t1i )]
−at1i y′i(p + t1i ) + yi(p + t1i ) − (1 + a)t1i y′i(p + t1i ) + aϑz′i(p + t1i ) = 0, i = 1, 2.
Plugging in aφ′(·) = 1 in the second condition immediately gives the equation stated in the
proposition. Using the optimal values for the output subsidy in the first equation pins down
e1i
∗. ‖
Chapter 2
Campaign Rhetoric and Policy
Making under Career Concerns
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the question when and to what extent promises made during an
electoral campaign are binding for politicians. It was one of the central insights in the theory
of political economy in the recent years that the political arena is plagued by commitment
problems. Not only are governments short sighted and do not or only partially internalize
the well being of their successors. It is also difficult to bind the hands of political actors by
contracts, as once in office they generally have the power to defy the rulings of any enforcing
institution (e.g. courts). A host of institutions can be interpreted as an attempt to limit
power abuse ex post.1
Besides being bound by institutions, the concern about individual (or collective) reputation
may act as a constraint on the behavior of political actors. In this paper we focus on the latter
mechanism to explore to what degree campaign promises are binding. Although this question
is of central importance in any theory of electoral competition, it has received scant attention
so far. Persson and Tabellini (2000) (p. 483) summarize the two dominant approaches so far
and also point to the unsatisfactory status quo.
“It is thus somewhat schizophrenic to study either extreme: where promises have
no meaning or where they are all that matters. To bridge the two models is an
important challenge.”
Two reasons can be brought forward for the relevance of this issue. First of all, if campaign
promises bear some commitment value, candidates vieing for office will anticipate this and
adapt their platforms accordingly. A better conception of the commitment implied by polit-
ical platforms should therefore foster our understanding of electoral competition. Moreover,
given that campaign promises are not pure cheap talk, they influence the policies imple-
mented ex post. Hence, the degree of commitment not only impacts the electoral race but
also policy choice.
As mentioned already, this project elaborates on the idea that reputational concerns may
make promise keeping optimal. In particular, we focus on a situation where a politician is
primarily concerned about the electorate’s assessment of his competence. Competence, as
1A few seminal contributions are Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997), Aghion and Bolton (2003), Aghion,
Alesina, and Trebbi (2004), and Messner and Polborn (2004).
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defined here, manifests itself in the candidate’s capability to identify the policy best suited for
the needs of the voters. For example, one could think of the politician’s ability to process and
distill information in order to find appropriate solutions to political problems. Alternatively,
the politician’s competence could measure the quality of his advisers or future cabinet.
Our approach is fundamentally different from existing papers where the candidates prime
reputational concern is to signal ideological congruence with the (median) voter. Indeed, we
will neglect any ideological component throughout the analysis. We do so for several reasons.
First, there is ample evidence that the electorate’s assessment of a candidate’s personal char-
acteristics strongly influences their voting behavior. Markus (1982) finds that in the 1980
election, Carter’s defeat against Reagan was not due to ideological differences but purely
due to different assessments of personal characteristics such as competence. Peterson (2005)
reports that voters in the US base their decision to the same extent on traits as on issues
and also shows that voters try to infer traits from political platforms. Second, models that
focus on ideology posit that the disciplining role of reputation stems from the fear that once
a politician has reneged on his platform, his promises will no longer be believed in the future.
The threat of being ousted from office in the future readily explains why promises are kept.
However, these models have a hard time in explaining why promises are broken.2 In partic-
ular, why do legislators often deviate on some issues but not on all, where the theory says
that independent of the particular deviation at hand, voters should carry out the harshest
punishment possible?3 For example, Harrington (1992) and Ringquist and Dasse (2004) find
that between 30% and 40% of campaign promises are broken. Also Budge and Hofferbert
(1990), King and Laver (1993), and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find that political platforms
have a partially binding character. The model developed here has the appealing feature that
it explains both promise keeping and breaking in a parsimonious framework.
But what exactly are the incentives which govern the politician’s decision to keep or break
his promises? In the model we will assume that before campaign promises are made and after
the election the politician receives information about the optimal course of action. Breaking
promises signals to the electorate that the political platform was based on poor information
and is therefore a sign of incompetence. To avoid this, a politician can try to gamble or mud-
dle through by sticking to his platform knowing that the implemented policy is likely to fail.
2For example, in Aragonès, Palfrey, and Postlewaite (2007) campaign promises are always honored.
3In section 5 we will discuss this point in more detail in a model with multiple policy dimensions.
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Hence, a central tension exists between the desire to appear competent and the utilization of
new information which is available after the election.
That this tension might lead to excessively stubborn behavior has also been recognized by
the popular press. Douglas Waller complains in the Times4 that since “economic conditions
are constantly changing [...] assumptions and policy decision made in one year can be DOA
by the next.” For this reason he wishes “to see politicians be more flexible” and that they
“did not keep the promises they make”.
In the model we explore the implications of this trade-off on the politician’s behavior both
at the campaign stage and ex post, after the elections took place. We construct an equilib-
rium where given the candidate’s platforms most of the information available ex post is used.
Nevertheless in equilibrium promises will be broken. We furthermore establish that promise
breaking signals low competence, so politicians benefit from the perception of having a firm
standpoint. This paper therefore endogenizes the cost of breaking campaign promises instead
of exogenously assuming it (as e.g. in Banks (1990)). Moreover, we provide a mechanism why
politicians who do not change their minds are attributed a valence5 advantage by the voters.
By this, we contribute to a newly emerging literature. An example is Kartik and McAfee
(2007) who explore the implications of the electorate’s preference for candidates with “char-
acter” on electoral competition. We see our paper as complementary to theirs: while we do
not model platform choice in as much detail, we investigate post-election behavior explicitly
and derive the electorate’s preference for candidates keeping their word endogenously.
Moreover the cost of breaking campaign promises need not be uniform across all issues. An
advantage of our approach is that we can relate these cost to the environment in which the
politician operates, e.g. the degree of uncertainty about his competence or the electorate’s
capability to assess the appropriateness of a certain policy. We can therefore make spe-
cific predictions under what circumstances campaign promises are more credible and which
promises will be revised more often.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Following a short review of the related literature, we will
present the model. After that the main properties of the equilibrium are derived, followed
by an investigation of the voting behavior of the electorate. Section 4 considers extensions of
4See “Why some Campaign Promises Should be Broken” in the Times from September 10, 2001.
5In this literature the term ‘valence’ refers to traits or characteristics of the policy maker which influence the
electorate’s preferences over candidates.
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the basic model. The chapter ends with a short conclusion.
2.1.1 Related Literature
The theory developed here attempts to bridge the two dominant approaches to model the link
between policy announcements before the election takes place and the actually implemented
policy. Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) were the first to model electoral competition. They
stand for one extreme approach which builds on the assumption that campaign promises are
binding. A very much celebrated result of this strand of the literature is the famous me-
dian voter theorem which states that political platforms will collapse to the median voter’s
preferred position. On the other extreme is the literature on post-election politics which
presumes that politicians are free to implement whatever policy serves their interests best.
This approach, which was pioneered by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), points to the im-
portance of selecting ideologically congruent politicians. In the so called citizen candidate
models, Osborne and Slivinksi (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) endogenize the pool of
candidates running for office.
In an intermediate approach the cost of breaking campaign promises were (exogenously) as-
sumed to be positive but not infinitely high. Banks (1990) studies the implications of this
presumption. This work was extended by Callander and Wilkie (2007) who allow for differ-
ential cost of breaking campaign promises across candidates. The first idea how to provide
a better microfoundation of the incentives politicians face ex post, was to invoke repeated
game arguments. The papers by Alesina (1988), Alesina and Spear (1988), Duggan (2000)
and Harrington (1993) illustrate how politicians concerned about their reputation achieve to
communicate (at least partially) their policy intentions. While in these approaches voters
are uncertain about the candidates’ ideological leanings, Kartik and McAfee (2007) take a
different route. Here politicians try to signal personal traits such as ”character” which are
valued by the electorate. As we are concerned about competence as a personal trait, our
model is close in spirit to them.
We thereby extend a literature which studies electoral competition with vertically differenti-
ated politicians. Bernhardt and Ingerman (1985), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones
and Palfrey (2002), and Groseclose (2001) study models of electoral competition where one of
the candidates has a valence advantage. In contrast to the approach pursued here, all these
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models start from the presumption that valence is observable to all voters or, alternatively,
can be credibly communicated. Moreover, the candidates can signal their valence only in
the campaign stage, while in our model, agents also strive to maintain their reputation after
elected into office.
There are relatively few papers which view politicians as “experts” who are concerned about
the electorate’s assessment of their competence. Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001),
Majumdar and Mukand (2004) and Fox (2007) are exceptions which in contrast to this pa-
per focus on the implications of this assumption on policy implementation, but neglect the
campaigning stage.
2.2 The Model
We consider a model with three players: the electorate and two politicians who compete
against each other to win an election by specifying a policy platform m ∈ {a, b}.6 We assume
that the platform is non binding, i.e. after the election the successful candidate is free to
implement either of two available policies d ∈ {a, b}.7 Making promises to the voters comes
at no cost, so the policy platforms are best thought of as pure cheap talk.
Which policy is best for the voters depends on the realization of a state of the world x ∈
X = {a, b}. The prior probability of state a being true is denoted by q ≥ 12 , i.e. the prior
is leaning toward state a. If the policy implemented fits the state of the world it will yield
a positive payoff ω = 1 to the electorate with probability λ. The wrong policy in turn never
generates any positive payoff, hence ω = 0. Formally, we assume that
Prob(ω = 1|d = x) = λ and Prob(ω = 1|d 
= x) = 0.
It is apparent that in absence of any information about the true state, all voters prefer policy
a over b, so we can think of policy measure a as a standard course of action. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that all members of the electorate share the same preferences, so we can think of
the voters as a unitary actor in what follows.
6Given that the information structure is binary, it comes without loss of generality to restrict the message
space of the politicians to two elements.
7Although most models take some interval to be the policy space, our binary specification is not unusual and
might in some circumstances even be more plausible, e.g. one either supports or is against stem cell research.
See Krasa and Polborn (2007).
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Before the politicians specify their platform, they both receive a signal s ∈ S = {a, b} about
the true state of the world. The signals are assumed to be conditionally independent. How
precise the information of the politician is, depends on his type denoted by θ ∈ Θ = {θ, θ̄}, θ̄ >
θ. The higher type occurs with ex ante probability p = 12 and possesses better information.
Specifically, we assume
Prob(s = x|θ) = θ, x ∈ {a, b}.
Hence the type of the agent denotes his probability of receiving a correct signal. To simplify
the exposition we will assume that the bad politician’s signal does not contain any information
and will set θ = 12 . Moreover we make the following assumption concerning the values of θ,
q and θ̄.
Assumption 2.1 θ̄ ≥ q ≥ θ.
This assumption has the following important implication. If a good politician receives a signal
in favor of state b he considers state b more likely to be true than state a, since the precision
of his information source is high enough to more than offset the prior, which is leaned toward
state a. The same is not true for the bad agent. Given that θ ≤ q, the bad politician’s
information is so noisy that even after s = b the chances to implement the appropriate policy
are higher under d = a.
Importantly we assume that the politician’s type is private information and only known to
him. One could think of different information sources that the politician uses the quality of
which is not observable to the public. Furthermore, the precision of the information is non
verifiable and can therefore not be credibly communicated to the electorate. However, the
politician can try to signal his type by the choice of his policy platform and the electorate
can condition its voting behavior on the campaign promises made.
After one of the politicians is voted into office he receives a second signal. We assume that
this second signal is perfect for both types of politicians, hence independent of competence
both candidates learn the true state of the world after the elections. Immediately thereafter
the politician in power has to decide over d.
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Each policy maker is concerned about his reputation. Specifically, we assume that the utility
uP of each candidate is given by the electorate’s assessment of his type.
uP = E(θ|m, d, ω) = Prob(θ̄|m, d, ω)θ̄ + Prob(θ|m, d, ω)θ, (2.1)
where the voters use all of their information I = (m, d, ω) to compute the politician’s ex-
pected type. Note that similar to the electorate we abstract from any ideological leanings of
the policy makers, as they have no preferences for a specific policy per se.8 Our “common
value” approach where in principle all citizens share the same preferences, has a long stand-
ing tradition in the field of Political Economy. Condorcet (1785) was the first one to assess
political institutions in the light of their capability to aggregate dispersed information such
that the optimal policy for the citizenry could be found. This approach has been revived very
recently. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997) put Condorcet’s insights on a solid game
theoretic basis and showed that this approach remains valid even if preference heterogeneity
is introduced.9 One possible rationale for this approach is that candidates fight primarily for
the support of the so called swing voters, i.e. voters who do not have a strong ideological
attachment to a certain party. Almost by definition, those voters care less about ideology
but may be more concerned about other candidate characteristics. Indeed, Woyke (2005) de-
scribes the priority determining the voting behavior of swing voters as follows: “Dabei geht es
weniger um detaillierte Problemlösungen, als darum, wem der Wähler die Lösungskompetenz
zuschreibt.”10
Moreover, in addition to the arguments already brought forward in the introduction, our
modelling strategy is also supported by the data. Sigelman and Sigelman (1986) find that
voters do support a politician even if his policy diverges from their bliss point, if they believe
that this divergence is caused by superior information on the politician’s side.
The preference configuration we use can be interpreted as a shortcut of a more general dy-
namic model, where the policy maker’s future success, e.g. his reelection probability depends
on the electorate’s assessment of his valence. The voters do also assess the ability of the
8The same assumption is made in the Downsian model.
9Piketty (1999) offers a good overview over this branch of research. See also Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2007)
for a paper strongly arguing in favor of the assumption that politicians can be viewed as experts holding
superior information.
10“It is not about detailed solutions to problems but rather, who is attributed the competence to solve the
problems.”
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loosing candidate by conditioning on his platform m and their information about the appro-
priateness of the platform as revealed by the realization of ω.11 In what follows we make
use of the fact that the expected type can be written as a linear function of the posterior
probability of the politician to be competent, since
E(θ|m, d, ω) = θ + π(m, d, ω)(θ̄ − θ),
where π(m, d, ω) := Prob(θ̄|m, d, ω). Hence to save notation we will define the policy maker’s
preferences directly over π(m, d, ω).
The electorate’s preferences are governed by their desire to elect a competent decision maker
and the probability of a correct decision. Competence may be valued beyond its indirect
impact on the appropriateness of the policy measure specified in the platform. For example,
one could argue that during his term in office the winning candidate must (at least with some
probability) handle problems unforeseen at the time the platforms were specified. If com-
petence is correlated across issues, which is a natural assumption if we think of competence
as also capturing the quality of the politician’s advisers or cabinet, the electorate directly
benefits from the selection of able types.
More specifically, we assume that given their information I the voters select a voting strategy
to maximize
uE = ηProb(θ̄|I) + (1 − η)Prob(d = x|I). (2.2)
The timing of the game can be summarized as follows.
1. Each policy maker receives s ∈ {a, b}.
2. Platforms m ∈ {a, b} are announced.
3. Election takes place.
4. Winning candidate learns true state of the world x.
5. Winning candidate chooses policy d ∈ {a, b}.
6. Realization of success or failure of the policy.
11There is evidence that some voters are indeed that sophisticated. See Butt (2006) for an illustration of the
electorate’s effort to assess the quality of the opposition.
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7. Pay-offs are realized.
Each politician’s strategy is given by functions m : S → Δ({a, b}) and d : S ×X → Δ({a, b})
where Δ({a, b}) denotes the set of probability distributions over the set {a, b}. The elec-
torate’s strategy is given by a voting function v : {a, b}×{a, b} → [0, 1] where v(·, ·) gives the
probability of voting in favor of candidate 1. In addition the voters use an updating function
B : {a, b}×{a, b}×{0, 1} → [0, 1] which gives the posterior probability of facing a good agent
given the voter’s information I. From this they can also compute the probability of a correct
policy to be implemented.
Throughout the paper we will focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). In a PBE each pol-
icy maker’s strategy must be optimal given the beliefs and the strategy of the other politician
and the electorate. Moreover the beliefs are formed through Bayes’ Rule whenever possible.
2.3 Analysis
Since the political platforms are non binding, the model outlined above is a cheap talk game.
It is well known that these games are plagued by a multiplicity of equilibria. In what follows
we will restrict attention to an equilibrium with the appealing property that given the plat-
form choice of candidates the maximum amount of information, which is available after the
election, is made use of. As we have assumed that politicians learn the true state of the world
after the election this is tantamount to an equilibrium where (given the platform choice) the
probability of the correct policy measure being implemented is highest. For this to happen,
revising one’s own previous political position must be least costly. This is the case if the good
type always implements the ex post efficient policy.
2.3.1 Basic Structure and Results
Even before the election takes place, the design of the political program may be governed by
strategic incentives. In particular, it is tempting to think that the candidates will distort their
electoral programs in order to win the election. This is not due to holding office is valuable per
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se12, but may be due to the possibility to conceal a faulty political platform. Hence, gaining
office may be valuable for pure reputational concerns. This will not be the case, however, since
the electorate correctly anticipates the gambling decision and can therefore not be fooled.13
Hence, in equilibrium the reputational payoffs adjust such that each candidate is indifferent
between winning and loosing the election. This has the important implication that the agents
will exclusively focus on maximizing their reputation. Equipped with this insight one can
prove the following result.
Proposition 2.1 There exists an equilibrium with the following structure.14
1. A good politician will always announce m = s and chooses d = x.
2. The bad politician sets
m =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
a if s = a
a if s = b with probability 1 − β
b if s = b with probability β
Moreover the bad politician will stick to his platform even after having learned that it
is wrong with probability γa ∈ (0, 1) if m = a (and x = b) and γb ∈ (0, 1) if m = b (and
x = a).
Proof: See the appendix.
Note that one can sustain an equilibrium where the good agent always behaves efficiently. If
he does, however, bad agents will sometimes ”gamble” in the sense that they adhere to their
platform although there is no chance of success. To understand why this must be the case,
consider the opposite. If the politicians were to behave in an ex post efficient manner, the
reputation of the agent would be unaffected whether the policy is a success or not. Once the
electorate knows whether the politician has received a correct or wrong signal (which it will
12Remember that we do not assume any rents from office.
13This effect is similar to Stein (1989) where a manager can boost short term profit at the expense of long
run performance. Analogous to the reasoning here the manager cannot increase firm value in equilibrium
because the market correctly anticipates the manager’s behavior.
14The equilibrium outlined here comes closest to the equilibria which are commonly studied in the literature
experts, see e.g. Levy (2004a) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a,b).
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if no agent gambles), the realization of ω carries no additional information. But as long as
the political platform contains some information about the politician’s signal, the agent will
earn a higher reputation in case of a correct signal. Hence the payoff attainable by sticking
to their platform would be higher, so agents would have no incentive anymore to revise the
own political program.
In addition to gambling ex post, bad politicians will also distort their political platform.
Reporting one’s own signal truthfully implies that the reputation does not depend on the
platform choice anymore, but only on the realization of ω and the fact whether the agent
has revised his platform. But assumption 2.1 ensures that even after having received a
signal in favor of state b the bad agent considers state a more likely to be true. Since his
reputation increases if the platform specifies the correct policy, bad types shy away from the
non standard policy b. Note, however, that the politician will not reveal his posterior either:
as his information is too noisy, this would mean to choose an electoral program with the
standard policy a all the time. It is then easy to see, that m = b would immediately reveal
a good type, so bad agents, despite distorting the platform toward the standard policy,
still behave too aggressive. The behavior of the agents in equilibrium and the resulting
reputational payoffs are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.2 In equilibrium the following relations hold.
1. Reputation: π(b, b, 1) > π(a, a, 1) > π(b, b, 0) = π(b, a, ω) > π(a, a, 0) = π(a, b, ω).
2. Gambling: γa > γ

b .
Proof: See the appendix.
Remember that π(m, d, ω) denotes the probability of facing a good type conditional on having
observed platform m, decision d, and outcome ω. As already indicated above, successful
politicians earn a higher reputation compared to their unsuccessful counterparts. While a
success reveals that the agent must have received the correct signal, a failure can be attributed
to two things: either the politician was just unlucky but has chosen the right policy or his
platform was incorrect, but he decided to gamble. Because only bad agents ignore ex post
available information, it is the second possibility which drives down reputation. Note also
that since a wrong policy never generates a success all agents must be indifferent between
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a failure and revising their platform. This implies, that the equilibrium has the reasonable
feature that reneging on one’s own campaign promises is a bad signal about competence.
This is a direct consequence from the fact that adjustment of the own position reveals wrong
ex ante information.
Hence, the model is insightful from a theoretical point of view as it provides a mechanism
which endogenizes the cost of reneging one’s own campaign promises. There are some recent
papers which analyze electoral competition under the assumption that politicians can deviate
from their previous announcement only at a cost. Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie
(2007) consider settings where politicians with potentially different inclinations to lie bear a
cost in case they renege on their initial political platform.
Moreover, the model indicates that the cost of breaking promises is not uniform over policy
dimensions, but can be traced back to fundamentals. How bad a platform revision is for
reputation is the driving force of the gambling decision. The proposition states that agents
who revise a standard political program suffer a sharper loss in reputation. To understand
this property of the model, note that promise breaking is the less costly the more often good
agents err on a specific platform. As competent candidates always adapt to new information,
the electorate knows in this case that even upon observing a platform revision, the probability
of facing a good type is still high. Hence, what makes breaking a standard platform so costly
is the fact that good agents only rarely make a mistake upon choosing m = a.15 This readily
explains the higher gambling incentive in case the agent has chosen the standard platform.
How the cost of promise breaking and hence ex post behavior of the agents is influenced by
the environment is presented in the following corollary.
corollary 2.1 (Comparative Statics)
1. γa increases in q while γ

b decreases in q.
2. Independently of platform choice, gambling decreases in λ and increases in (θ̄ − θ).
Proof: See the appendix.
15As the prior is based in favor of state a and good agents always choose m = s, the good agent is much more
likely to choose the right platform upon s = a.
Campaign Rhetoric 50
The first part of the corollary says that the gambling intensities move in different directions
as policy measure a becomes more likely to be optimal. Ceteris paribus, upon observing
(b, b, 0) the electorate understands that the higher is q the more likely platform b turned out
to be the wrong one. Hence, to a larger extent a failure is attributed to a bad agent being
wrong and gambling than to bad luck. This drives down the payoff from sticking to platform
b and therefore makes gambling less attractive. Exactly the reverse holds true for m = a
which explains the higher gambling incentive for q rising.
Additionally the corollary states that politicians will use more ex post information if their
performance can be monitored better. The lower is λ the less information the electorate
obtains regarding the appropriateness of the implemented policy. Confessing that the own
political program is based on incorrect information clearly becomes less attractive under these
circumstances. Higher gambling is therefore predicted in those policy areas which have long
term consequences and in which the electorate lacks assessment capability. In both cases it
is reasonable to assume that the electorate’s signal is only loosely related to the optimality
of the chosen policy. In the model this is represented by a lower value of λ.
The last part of the corollary states that higher type uncertainty as measured by the differ-
ence between a good and a bad type decreases ex post efficiency. To see why, assume that
the information of the good agent becomes better. This depresses the reputation attached
to breaking one’s own political promises because this payoff depends on how often the good
type receives a wrong signal relative to the bad type.16 Accordingly, sticking to the own
platform becomes more attractive. This logic might be especially pervasive in new or quickly
changing political fields, where politicians do not have a well established track record and
so uncertainty about their competence is highest. According to our theory especially these
fields should be characterized by stubborn behavior.
16It may be illustrative to take a look at the extreme case where the good agent’s signal becomes perfect, i.e.
θ̄ = 1. As the good agent’s signal can never be wrong, revising one’s own platform would immediately reveal
the bad type, hence gambling will always occur.
Campaign Rhetoric 51
2.3.2 The Voting Decision
We have already shown that the politicians in the model simply strive to maximize their rep-
utation and do not care about winning office. Nevertheless it is an interesting question which
(if any) platform has an advantage in the electoral race. The answer to that question will
crucially depend on the importance voters assign to the selection of able politicians relative
to the likelihood of correct decision making.
We will start with the first dimension determining the voting decision, namely the electorate’s
assessment of the politician’s type given the observed platform. In general, one can distin-
guish two competing forces. To see the point most clearly, assume first that all types of
agents truthfully report their information during the campaign (so β = 1). As incompetent
candidates only receive noise they obtain both signals and therefore select both platforms
with equal probability. Good types, however, would choose the standard platform m = a
more often.17 Thus, under truthful reporting the composition of agents choosing m = a is
better. However, we know already that through the desire to appear competent bad types
distort their platform and shy away from m = b. It turns out that this countervailing effect
is stronger.
Lemma 2.1 The electorate’s assessment of the agent’s type is higher after having observed
m = b.
Proof: See the appendix.
Note that this lemma makes intuitive sense given that we have already seen that higher rep-
utational payoffs can be earned with the non standard platform.
The lemma substantiates the feeling of a tension between competence and populism. Carrillo
and Castanheira (2007) report several circumstances where parties adopting centrist plat-
forms lost elections by a landslide mainly because the electorate’s assessment of their valence
deteriorated. They offer an explanation based on moral hazard problems. When selecting
a non-centrist platform a politician handicaps himself since his program is inferior from an
ideological point of view. To retain a chance of winning, the program must be superior in a
17This is a direct consequence from state a being more likely and the good politicians receiving a signal
correlated with the state.
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second dimension, e.g. quality. Since the electorate can observe the program’s quality with
some probability, non centrist platforms are a signal of effort exertion.18
It is not straightforward to relate our theory to Carrillo and Castanheira (2007) as we do not
consider an ideological policy space. What both theories have in common, however, is the
fact that policy platforms contain information about some characteristic of the policy maker.
In that sense, centrist platforms in Carrillo and Castanheira (2007) can be compared to the
expected platform m = a here since both contain unfavorable news; shirking in Carrillo and
Castanheira (2007), lower competence here. If one is willing to accept this analogy, our the-
ory which stresses an adverse selection effect can be regarded as complementary. Unexpected
or “non centrist” platforms are adopted predominantly by more competent candidates. Our
focus on reputational concerns allows us also to relax ex ante observability and therefore
voter sophistication requirements. For the reputational mechanism to operate it is sufficient
if the electorate can (at least with some probability) assess the appropriateness of a policy
after implementation.
In its spirit our signaling mechanism is also closely related to Kartik and McAfee (2007) and
it might be interesting to draw a comparison. In Kartik and McAfee (2007) politicians stick
to their platform in order to signal “character” which for exogenous reasons is valued by
the electorate.19 The farer away an observed political program is from the median voter’s
position, the more likely the corresponding politician possesses character. Hence our model
shares a central prediction with them: more extreme and unexpected policy announcements
are made by candidates who have a valence advantage.
There is some evidence that lends support to our modeling strategy as it suggests that voters
do value competence over other personal characteristics which may be incorporated in the
term “character”. Greene (2001) and Newman (2003), for example, report that the elec-
torate’s assessment of competence is more important for approval rates than integrity.
18This kind of handicapping can also work within a party. If the party’s leadership has preferences different
from the rank and file, then the rank and file’s support for the leadership may also signal competence to the
voters. See Caillaud and Tirole (1999, 2002) for an exposition of that idea.
19A politician with character here is bound to reveal his policy intentions truthfully, i.e. he bears an infinite
cost of lying.
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The second dimension voters may care about is the likelihood that a correct policy is imple-
mented. The respective probabilities are given by
Prob(d = x|m = a) = λ
[
1 − (1 − p)(1 − q)(1 − θβ)γa
Prob(m = a)
]
Prob(d = x|m = b) = λ
[
1 − (1 − p)q(1 − θ)βγb
Prob(m = b)
]
Both expressions have a straightforward interpretation and illustrate nicely the main forces
at work. A prerequisite for a successful outcome conditional on m is that the ex post correct
decision is taken (the terms in squared brackets). This will always happen besides a bad agent
(who occurs with probability (1 − p)), who has chosen the wrong platform (which happens
with probability (1−q)(1−θβ) if m = a and with probability q(1−θ)β if m = b was selected)
decides to gamble (respective probabilities γa and γb).
The two expressions point to three main effects. First of all, there is the composition effect
which we have already derived in the lemma above. As bad agents shy away from the
unexpected platform the chance of facing a good candidate is higher under m = b, i.e.
(1 − θ)β < (1 − θβ). Although the average type selecting the non standard platform is
better, the likelihood that this platform was incorrectly adopted is larger. This is a simple
consequence from the fact that state a occurs with a higher probability (in general, (1 −
q)(1 − θβ) < q(1 − θ)β as we will see below). We call this effect the error probability effect.
Lastly, even if a non standard program turns out to be wrong ex post, we cannot conclude
that an inappropriate policy will be implemented. This is because we already know that
politicians are more inclined to gamble given that they have selected m = a, what we will
call the gambling effect.
Unfortunately it turns out that the interaction of these effects is highly complex, so it is not
possible to analytically derive conditions which pin down the probabilities of correct decision
making. Instead we resort to numerical simulations of the model. In all tables we fixed the
values of q and g and varied the observability parameter λ. The difference between tables 1
and 2 is that q increases from 0.6 (table 1) to 0.7 (table 2) while θ̄ is held constant at 0.8.
Before we turn to the success probabilities let me explain first the behavior of the endogenous
variables β and γi dependent on parameter values. As one can directly see, β decreases in
both the observability parameter λ and the prior q. This makes intuitive sense. As the bad
agent is concerned about adopting the correct platform he will opt more often for m = a
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if he assigns a higher probability to state a being true. If monitoring becomes better (λ
goes up) this effect is amplified. Higher observability implies that the electorate attributes
failures more strongly to a wrong policy choice instead of bad luck. Since the wrong policy
is only implemented by bad candidates, preventing a failure becomes more important, hence
β declines. A very similar intuition applies to the gambling decision. With a low degree of
monitoring, revising one’s platform and thereby confessing a wrong platform choice is rather
unattractive since the electorate cannot tell apart wrong policies from bad luck. Hence,
gambling increases as observability deteriorates.
Comparing tables 1 and 2 one can see that the change in q has nearly no effect on the
composition of agents. The higher error probability given platform b in table 2 can therefore
almost fully be attributed to the smaller prior probability of state b occurring. However,
turning to the success probabilities, the higher probability of having selected m = a correctly
is almost completely offset by the change in the gambling intensities. To understand this
effect, remember that able candidates always report their signal in the campaign stage. As q
increases, the likelihood that a good type has incorrectly adopted platform a, and therefore
the probability that a good type revises this platform, goes down. But this, in turn, makes
incompetent candidates much more hesitant to revise their former positions, since the cost
in terms of reputation goes up (e.g. for λ = 0.7, γa rises from 0.482 to 0.552 as q increases
from 0.6 to 0.7). The reverse effect holds true for m = b. Note that here the probability of
correct decision making actually increases as q goes up, i.e. the higher error probability is
more than compensated by lower gambling.
Comparing success probabilities across platforms we can see that given λ is high enough,
candidates which have chosen the ex ante unexpected program will implement the appropriate
policy more often. For low values of observability, gambling is pervasive across all platforms,
so the error probability effect dominates. As monitoring improves, two effects contribute to
the higher success probabilities. First, β goes down, i.e. incompetent types choose better
platforms. Second, the gambling incentive goes down, but it does so asymmetrically. While
gambling is still rather common given m = a, it rapidly decreases under m = b (e.g., if q = 0.7
and λ = 0.9 gambling is more than three times as likely under m = a compared to m = b).
As soon as λ passes some threshold value, the gambling effect drives the success probability
given m = a below the one given m = b.
To examine the robustness of these results, we can compare these findings with tables 3 and
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4 which can be found in the appendix. Here we leave q constant at 0.6 and vary θ̄ from
0.7 in table 3 to 0.9 in table 4.20 As one can see immediately, the qualitative results are
very similar. Again the composition and the error probability effect stay almost constant
as θ̄ increases. However, a higher spread between types has dramatic consequences for the
gambling propensities. The better the good agent becomes the less likely he runs on a
wrong platform, which makes incompetent candidates much more reluctant to utilize new
information if it is in conflict with their platform. As a consequence the success probabilities
across all platforms decline. Again, for low values of observability, a standard platform is
conducive to correct decision making ex post, while the reverse is true for higher values of λ.
We can summarize the consequences of the preceding discussion on the voting decision as
follows.
Observation 2.1 (Voting Decision)
1. Voters will always vote for a candidate with platform b (if there is any) if λ is high
enough.
2. If λ is low and η is low enough, a candidate with a standard platform (if there is any)
wins the election.
Remember that η measures the importance of selecting an able politician. Candidates with
m = a are only preferred by the electorate if they implement the correct policy more often
(i.e. λ must be low enough) and the voters are sufficiently concerned about correct decision
making (i.e. η is low enough). In all other circumstances the electorate will vote for politicians
with program b, since we have seen that running on platform b contains favorable news about
the agent’s type. Given that both candidates specified the same program, the electorate is
indifferent between them and votes for either of the two.
2.4 Extensions
In this section we will consider an alternative equilibrium structure and will extend the model
to multiple policy dimensions.
20The qualitative results do not hinge on by how much θ̄ is increased.
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2.4.1 Candidate Ambiguity
It is well known and often complained about that candidates in an election refuse to make
clear statements but deliberately choose ambiguous positions. This insight goes back at least
to Downs (1957) who noticed that at the “critical issues” the candidate’s incentive to “be-
cloud their policies in a fog of ambiguity” is highest.
The model outlined here is a natural framework to study ambiguous platforms. Note that as
ambiguity is best understood as a less than perfect correlation between platforms and imple-
mented policies, all candidates in the equilibrium studied so far are to some extent ambiguous.
In what follows we want to show that if the importance of correct decision making becomes
sufficiently high, an even higher degree of ambiguity might be optimal for the citizens.
To see this, assume that policy platforms are completely unrelated to the politician’s informa-
tion. If that is the case the candidates bear no reputational cost if they adapt their platform
to new information, nor do they benefit from sticking to their positions. This is true, since
the electorate (knowing that platforms are pure “babbling”) cannot draw any inference about
competence from platform choice and subsequently implemented policies, as these choices do
not depend on the agent’s type.21 It is therefore optimal for both candidates to make use
of all ex post available information. Moreover, if the electorate believes that platforms are
unrelated to information, it should not pay any attention to them. This, in turn, makes it
(weakly) optimal for the candidates to “babble” when specifying their platforms. We can
summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3 There exists an “babbling” equilibrium with the property of efficient de-
cision making ex post which is optimal for the citizens as soon as correct decision making
becomes important enough (i.e. for η sufficiently low).
The downside of this kind of equilibrium is that it makes both types of candidates indis-
tinguishable ex ante. Hence, the less information is contained in the platforms, the worse
selection of candidates will be.
The explanation for ambiguity we offer differs from existing approaches which emphasize the
policy maker’s endeavor to hide his true policy preferences from the electorate in order to
21Ex ante, platform choice does not depend on information while ex post both types of agents hold the same
information.
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increase his election probability.22 In contrast to the theory outlined here, ambiguity there
always harms voters and can therefore only be sustained in equilibrium if some degree of
ambiguity is inevitable. Otherwise voters could (and had an incentive to) punish candidates
by not electing them. We show instead that ambiguity can even be in the interest of the
voters, if they care sufficiently about the implementation of the best policy measure. It may
then well be optimal to exchange the screening of candidates for their higher propensity to
utilize ex post available information.23
Coming back to the introductory quotation by Downs that candidates are especially prone to
ambiguous platforms on the “critical” issues, we can speculate about the following rationale.
It may well be an optimal social arrangement that political candidates are ambiguous in
those dimensions where binding one’s hands is expensive (e.g. where correct decision making
is important, i.e. the “critical” ones), while they try to differentiate themselves by signaling
their type in the remaining dimensions. This discussion already suggests the importance of
a multidimensional specification of the model. This is, where we turn to next.
2.4.2 Multiple Policy Dimensions
The main purpose of this section is to extend the model to multiple policy dimensions and to
show that an equilibrium analogous to the one studied in the previous part of the paper still
exists. Such an equilibrium has the interesting property that the candidates will renege on
a subset of their campaign promises with positive probability. This is fully in line with the
empirical evidence that has established that on average politicians break between 30% and
40% of their promises.24
However, previous models that employ a repeated game logic to show how politicians can
be restrained, have a difficult time establishing partial promise breaking. In these models,
politicians are disciplined through the threat from being never elected again once they renege
on their platform. From the theory of optimal penal codes in repeated games (see Abreu
(1988)) we know that citizens can achieve maximal deterrence by employing the harshest
22See Alesina and Cukierman (1990) for an exposition of this idea.
23An explanation for ambiguity which also stresses the value of being unconstrained in decision making after
the election, has also been offered by Glazer (1990) in a framework where candidates’ platforms are binding.
24See Harrington (1992), Ringquist and Dasse (2004) , Budge and Hofferbert (1990), King and Laver (1993),
and Poole and Rosenthal (1997).
Campaign Rhetoric 59
possible punishment, once a deviation took place. This implies that every politician who
has reneged on only one of his promises is permanently expelled from office.25 This clearly
renders selective promise breaking suboptimal. We should either observe promise keeping in
all dimensions or defections across (almost) all political issues.
In contrast to this kind of mechanism, the theory outlined here naturally generates partial
promise keeping when extended to multiple policy dimensions. we show in Appendix B,
that an equilibrium exists where candidates’ gambling decision is independent across policy
dimensions, so that with strictly positive probability selective promise breaking will occur.
Proposition 2.4 In the multidimensional model it can be optimal for the agents to renege
on a subset of their promises.
Proof: See Appendix B.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we developed a model where the politician’s main concern was the electorate’s
assessment of his competence. In contrast to the literature where agents are differentiated
through different levels of valence which they can signal through platform choice, here can-
didates can influence the perception of their competence both before and after the elections.
A central tension exists in the model between the agent’s desire to uphold his reputation
and adapting to new information. This set up enables us to study the incentives to keep or
break campaign promises. We established that an equilibrium can be supported where agents
distort their platform but where a substantial amount of ex post available information is uti-
lized. In this equilibrium agents who choose unexpected platforms earn a higher reputation.
For his reason those platforms are adopted inefficiently often.
We also examined which incentives govern the politician’s policy implementation decision.
In particular, we related the propensity to break campaign promises to the environment in
which the politician operates, for example, the degree of uncertainty about a candidate’s
competence, the amount of observability or the electorate’s assessment capability of the ap-
propriateness of a given policy measure, and the ex ante probability of a certain policy to be
25See also Bernheim and Whinston (1990) who employ this logic to study collusion under multimarket contact.
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optimal. Moreover, the model additionally gives a rationale for the optimality of ambiguous
platforms and the widely observed behavior of politicians to renege on a subset of their cam-
paign promises.
A natural next step would be to integrate an ideological dimension in a nontrivial way into
the model. This would allow us to study the interaction of the politician’s desire to appear
competent with the temptation to follow his own most preferred agenda. Furthermore, it
seems worthwhile to investigate multiple policy dimensions in more detail. Some issues we
have only touched upon could then be analyzed more thoroughly. For example, it would be
interesting to explore further on which issues candidates prefer to appear ambiguous. More-
over, there could be interesting interactions between the decision to revise one’s platform
across different dimensions, an issue we did not examine in the previous section.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Appendix A: Proofs of Section 2.3
Proof of proposition 2.1
First of all we will define the reputational values attached to different outcomes (m, d, ω),
given the equilibrium structure laid out in the text. To make the interpretation of the
expressions clear we will not replace θ and p with 12 .
π(b, b, 1) =
pθ̄(1 − q)λ
pθ̄(1 − q)λ + (1 − p)[(1 − q)θβλ] .
A good agent chooses m = b if he receives a signal in favor of state b. He will stick to his
announcement if it was correct, which happens with probability θ̄(1−q). Given this, a success
will realize with probability λ. Therefore, pθ̄(1− q)λ is the probability of facing a good agent
given the electorate observes (b, b, 1). Analogously, (1−p)[(1−q)θβλ] denotes the probability
that a bad agent generates realization (b, b, 1). Notice that this expression does not depend
on γb, since given that a policy proves to be successful, the electorate knows with certainty
that the agent has not gambled.
The remaining probabilities can be interpreted in a completely analogous way.
π(b, b, 0) =
pθ̄(1 − q)(1 − λ)
pθ̄(1 − q)(1 − λ) + (1 − p)[(1 − q)θβ(1 − λ) + q(1 − θ)βγb]
.
If the voters observe a failure they attribute this in part to bad luck, as the agent might still
have chosen the right policy (the probability of this is given by all terms which are multiplied
by (1 − λ)). However, a failure might also be due to a bad agent whose policy platform was
wrong and who decided to gamble (the last term in the denominator).
π(b, a, ω) =
p(1 − θ̄)
p(1 − θ̄) + (1 − p)(1 − θ)β(1 − γb)
It is important to observe that as soon as the agent revises his electoral platform, his reputa-
tion no longer depends on the realization of ω. When changing his policy, the agent admits
that he has received a wrong signal. In this case the realization of a success or failure does
not contain any additional information about the agent’s type anymore.
The same explanations given above hold also true for the reputation obtained under m = a.
π(a, a, 1) =
pθ̄qλ
pθ̄qλ + (1 − p)q(1 − (1 − θ)β)λ,
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π(a, a, 0) =
pqθ̄(1 − λ)
pqθ̄(1 − λ) + (1 − p)[q(1 − β(1 − θ))(1 − λ) + (1 − q)(1 − θβ)γa]
,
π(a, b, ω) =
p(1 − θ̄)
p(1 − θ̄) + (1 − p)(1 − θβ)(1 − γa)
.
Next, we will show that the strategies specified in the text constitute an equilibrium. We will
start with the proof for the existence of γa and γ

b .
The bad agent will gamble with a positive probability if he is exactly indifferent between
revising and sticking to his platform, after having learned that his policy announcement was
wrong. Sine he knows that gambling cannot produce a success the incentive constraint is
given by
π(b, a, ω) = π(b, b, 0),
in case of m = b. Note that π(b, a, ω) is strictly increasing while π(b, b, 0) is strictly decreasing
in γb. Setting γb = 1 cannot be an equilibrium as retracing one’s platform would then reveal
to be a good type. If γb = 0 , π(b, b, 0) =
pθ̄
pθ̄+(1−p)θβ which is strictly larger than π(b, a, ω)
under γb = 0. By the intermediate value theorem there must exist a γb ∈ (0, 1), such that
π(b, a, ω) = π(b, b, 0).
Analogously we show the existence of γa. The incentive constraint here is given by
π(a, b, ω) = π(a, a, 0).
By the same argument as above, γa = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. If γa goes to zero, we
obtain
π(a, a, 0) =
pθ̄
pθ̄ + (1 − p)(1 − θβ) >
p(1 − θ̄)
p(1 − θ̄) + (1 − p)(1 − θβ) = π(a, b, ω).
Again by the intermediate value theorem the existence of γa ∈ (0, 1) is guaranteed.
If the incentive constraints above are satisfied, both types of agents will find it optimal to
stick to their policy platform given m = b if it is correct as
π(b, a, ω) < λπ(b, b, 1) + (1 − λ)π(b, b, 0),
where the right hand side denotes the politician’s expected reputation by sticking to his
campaign promise. The same argument holds if m = a.
Next we will focus on the existence of β. To determine the bad agent’s incentives to manip-
ulate his platform one has to consider the following incentive constraint which must hold in
Campaign Rhetoric 63
case the agent has received s = b:
(1 − q)θ[λπ(b, b, 1) + (1 − λ)π(b, b, 0)] + q(1 − θ)π(b, a, ω) =
q(1 − θ)[λπ(a, a, 1) + (1 − λ)π(a, a, 0)] + (1 − q)θπ(a, b, ω).
The left hand side denotes the expected utility of the agent if he decides to follow his signal.
Given that s = b state b will realize with probability Prob(x = b|s = b) = (1−q)θ(1−q)θ+q(1−θ) .
In that case the agent will stick to his platform and receives either the payoff attached to
a success π(b, b, 1) with probability λ or the reputation associated with a failure. With
probability Prob(x = a|s = b) = (1−θ)q(1−q)θ+q(1−θ) the signal was wrong and the agent receives
π(b, a, ω). The right hand side of the equation in turn is the expected payoff under policy a.
We will prove the existence of β by using the intermediate value theorem again. For this
note first that all reputational payoffs associated with action b are decreasing in β while the
reverse is true for the payoffs under m = a. Moreover, both sides are continuous functions of
β.
It is straightforward to see that β = 0 can never be an equilibrium, since then m = b would
only be chosen by the more competent agent, hence the left hand side would exceed the
right hand side. Consider now the case of β = 1. Then π(b, b, 1) = π(a, a, 1). For the
incentive constraint to be satisfied, π(b, a, ω) must be larger than π(a, b, ω) since the payoff
in case of a successful policy accrues with a smaller probability if d = b. For this to be true,
γa < γb must hold. But straightforward calculations reveal that under γa < γb we obtain
that π(b, b, 0) > π(a, a, 0) holds, a contradiction given the equilibrium condition for the γi.
Hence given equilibrium values γi , the right hand side exceeds the left hand side for β = 1.
Hence, the constraint must be satisfied for some intermediate value β ∈ (0, 1).
Lastly, note that given that the agent is indifferent between choosing m = a or m = b after he
has received a signal in favor of state b, he will strictly prefer m = a after s = a. One can also
directly see that given indifference of the bad type, a good type with superior information
will always find it optimal to follow his signal. ‖
Proof of proposition 2.2
The fact that π(b, b, 1) > π(a, a, 1) follows directly from the fact that β < 1.
In equilibrium the incentive constraint for the γi must be satisfied. Setting π(a, b, ω) =
π(a, a, 0) and π(b, a, ω) = π(b, b, 0) one can solve for the equilibrium values of γi as a function
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of β. One obtains
γa =
q(1 − λ)(2θ̄ − 1)
(1 − q)(1 − θ̄) + q(1 − λ)θ̄ ,
γb =
(1 − λ)(1 − q)(θ̄ − θ)
(1 − θ)[(1 − θ̄)q + θ̄(1 − λ)(1 − q)] .
Note that both γa and γb do not depend on β. It is now easy to see that γa ≥ γb as
γa − γb = (θ̄ − θ)(1 − θ̄)(2q − 1) ≥ 0.
Substituting the equilibrium values back in the expressions for π(a, b, ω) and π(b, a, ω) re-
spectively yields
π(a, b, ω) =
(1 − q)(1 − θ̄) + q(1 − λ)θ̄
(1 − q)(1 − θ̄) + q(1 − λ)θ̄ + (1 − q)(1 − θβ) + q(1 − λ)(1 − β(1 − θ)) ,
π(b, a, ω) =
q(1 − θ̄) + (1 − q)(1 − λ)θ̄
q(1 − θ̄) + (1 − q)(1 − λ)θ̄ + β[(1 − θ)q + (1 − q)(1 − λ)θ] .
We will now show that there exists an upper bound β̂ = 2[q(1 − θ̄) + (1 − q)θ̄], such that
for all parameter constellations the equilibrium value of β is weakly smaller than β̂. In the
next step it will be proven that given this upper bound the equilibrium reputational payoffs
satisfy the relations stated in the proposition.
Tedious calculations show that the equilibrium value of β is decreasing in λ. Intuitively,
as monitoring becomes better, making the correct decision becomes more important for the
agent. Hence, more likely he will switch away from m = b. To derive the upper bound on β
it is therefore sufficient to consider the case λ = 0. Under this circumstances, and plugging
in the upper bound of β, we arrive at the following payoffs:
π(a, a, 1) =
θ̄
θ̄(1 + q) + (1 − q)(1 − θ̄) , π(a, b, ω) =
1
2
,
π(b, b, 1) =
θ̄
2θ̄(1 − q) + q , π(b, a, ω) =
1
2
.
Consider now the equilibrium condition for β. We know that in general the left hand side is
decreasing in β while the right hand side increases. Hence, if at β̂ the left hand side is smaller
than the right hand side, we have established that β̂ indeed is an upper bound. Plugging in
β̂ in the equilibrium condition for β we obtain
λ
[
θ̄
2θ̄(1 − q) + q −
θ̄
θ̄(1 + q) + (1 − q)(1 − θ̄)
]
≤ 1
2
λ(1 − 2q)
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Multiplying out gives
1
2
θ̄(1 − 2q) ≤ (1 − 2q)
(
1
2
θ̄(q2 + (1 − q)2
)
+ (1 − q)q
(
θ̄2 +
1
4
)
⇐⇒(
θ̄ − 1
2
)2
≥ 0,
which is always satisfied.
π(a, b, ω) < π(b, a, ω) follows directly as the difference π(a, b, ω) − π(b, a, ω) decreases in λ
and both expressions are equal at β̂ for λ = 0. ‖
Proof of Lemma 2.1
If the sole information of the electorate is given by the political platform, the voters assign
the following probabilities to the agent being good:
Prob(θ̄|m = a) = qθ̄ + (1 − q)(1 − θ̄)
[qθ̄ + (1 − q)(1 − θ̄)] + [q(1 − β(1 − θ)) + (1 − q)(1 − βθ)] ,
Prob(θ̄|m = b) = (1 − q)θ̄ + q(1 − θ̄)
[(1 − q)θ̄ + q(1 − θ̄)] + β[(1 − q)θ + q(1 − θ)] .
The expected type conditional on having announced m = b is better if the likelihood ratio of
Prob(θ̄|m = a) is smaller than the likelihood ratio of Prob(θ̄|m = b), i.e.
qθ̄ + (1 − q)(1 − θ̄)
q(1 − β(1 − θ)) + (1 − q)(1 − βθ) <
(1 − q)θ̄ + q(1 − θ̄)
β[(1 − q)θ + q(1 − θ)] .
Solving this equation for β we obtain that
Prob(θ̄|m = a) < Prob(θ̄|m = b) ⇐⇒ β ≤ 2[q(1 − θ̄) + (1 − q)θ̄].
From the proof of proposition 2.2, we know that this is always satisfied. ‖
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2.6.2 Appendix B: Outline of the Multidimensional Model
We extend the model to two dimensions j = 1, 2. Both dimensions are identical to the
one dimensional model, i.e. there are for each dimension respectively, two possible states
xj ∈ {aj , bj}, two possible signals sj ∈ {aj , bj}, two possible platform announcements
mj = {aj , bj}, two possible decisions dj ∈ {aj , bj} and the outcomes ωj ∈ {0, 1}. We as-
sume furthermore that λj := λ, j = 1, 2 denotes the probability of success (ωj = 1) given
dj = xj . We take the realizations of ωj to be independent variables.
We look for the existence of an equilibrium where good agents set m = (m1, m2) = (s1, s2)
and d = (d1, d2) = (x1, x2). The bad agent will choose mj = aj whenever sj = aj and also
with probability (1−βj) if sj = bj , j = 1, 2. Hence, if sj = bj bad types will set mj = bj with
probability βj ∈ (0, 1). Ex post bad agents will gamble with probability γja and γjb , j = 1, 2
respectively. Importantly, we assume that β1 and β2 and also the choices of the γ
j
m, j = 1, 2
are set independently from each other. This implies that after having learned that m1 
= x1
and m2 
= x2 the agent will break his promises partially, e.g. in the first dimension only but
not in the second one with probability (1 − γ1m)γ2m > 0.
In what comes we will focus on the case where m1 = m2 = b, all other instances can be derived
analogously.26 First we derive the respective reputational payoffs π((m, d, ω)1, (m, d, ω)2) if
(mj , dj , ωj) := (m, d, ω)j , j = 1, 2 is observed.27
π((b, a, ω)1, (b, b, 1)2) =
q(1 − q)θ̄λ(1 − θ̄)
q(1 − q)θ̄λ(1 − θ̄) + q(1 − q)θβ2λ(1 − θ)β2(1 − γ1b )
π((b, a, ω)1, (b, a, ω)2) =
(1 − θ̄)2
(1 − θ̄)2 + (1 − θ)2β1β2(1 − γ1b )(1 − γ2b )
π((b, a, ω)1, (b, b, 0)2) =
q(1 − q)θ̄(1 − λ)(1 − θ̄)
q(1 − q)θ̄(1 − λ)(1 − θ̄) + q(1 − θ)β1(1 − γ1b )[(1 − q)θβ2(1 − λ) + q(1 − θ)β2γ2b ]
π((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 1)2) =
(1 − q)2θ̄2λ(1 − λ)
(1 − q)2θ̄2λ(1 − λ) + (1 − q)θβ2λ[(1 − q)θβ1(1 − λ) + q(1 − θ)β1γ1b ]
26Note that m1 = m2 = b will be played by the bad agent with strictly positive probability, since otherwise
this platform configuration would immediately reveal a good type.
27We will only derive those needed for the proof.
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π((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 0)2) =
(1 − q)2θ̄2(1 − λ)2
(1 − q)2θ̄2(1 − λ)2 +
⎧⎨⎩ (1 − q)2θ
2β1β2(1 − λ)2 + (1 − q)θβ1(1 − λ)q(1 − θ)β2γ2b
+q(1 − θ)β1γ1b (1 − q)θβ2(1 − λ) + q2(1 − θ)2β1β2γ1b γ2b
⎫⎬⎭
It is clearly suboptimal to set one or both of the γjb equal to one, as in this case a platform
configuration would exist that is revised by good types only. Hence, in this case a reduction
of γjb would increase the agent’s utility. Next, we will show that γ
j
b = 0 cannot be optimal
either as then an increase in γjb would be optimal for the agent. We will then stress continuity
and use the intermediate value theorem to argue that some intermediate values of the γjb ,
j = 1, 2 constitute an equilibrium.
The incentives to gamble arise only if the agent learned that he has specified an incorrect
platform. We have to distinguish between the case, where only one dimension is false and
the situation with two wrong specifications.
1. Consider first m1 
= x1 and m2 = x2.
We will show that for all γb2 the value of γ
b
1 must be larger than zero. Assume the opposite
were true. Then the reputational payoff from changing the platform (in the first dimension)
must exceed the payoff obtained through gambling, i.e.
λπ((b, a, ω)1, (b, b, 1)2)+(1−λ)π((b, a, ω)1, (b, b, 0)2) ≥ λπ((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 1)2)+(1−λ)π((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 0)2).
However, if γ1b = 0 was an equilibrium, the electorate would correctly anticipate the behavior
of the bad agent and we would obtain the following reputational payoffs.
π((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 1)2) =
θ̄2
θ̄2 + θ2β1β2
,
π((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 0)2) =
θ̄2(1 − q)(1 − λ)
θ̄2(1 − q)(1 − λ) + θβ1β2[(1 − q)(1 − λ)θ + q(1 − θ)γ2b ]
.
These payoffs are larger than the values on the left hand side as
π((b, a, ω)1, (b, b, 1)2) =
θ̄(1 − θ̄)
θ̄(1 − θ̄) + θ(1 − θ)β1β2
<
θ̄2
θ̄2 + θ2β1β2
and
π((b, a, ω)1, (b, b, 0)2) =
θ̄(1 − θ̄)(1 − q)(1 − λ)
θ̄(1 − θ̄)(1 − q)(1 − λ) + (1 − θ)β1β2[(1 − q)(1 − λ)θ + q(1 − θ)γ2b ]
<
θ̄2(1 − q)(1 − λ)
θ̄2(1 − q)(1 − λ) + θβ1β2[(1 − q)(1 − λ)θ + q(1 − θ)γ2b ]
= π((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 0)2).
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Hence the optimality condition for γ1b = 0 cannot be satisfied. Note however that all terms
on the left hand side increase in γ1b while all terms on the right hand side decrease in γ
1
b . We
can therefore find an intermediate value of γ1b which exactly solves the condition. Given this
value of γ1b the bad agent is exactly indifferent between gambling and revising, hence this
value is part of an equilibrium.
2. Take now the case of m1 
= x1 and m2 
= x2. For γ1b = 0 to be optimal it must be true
that
π((b, a, ω)1, (b, b, 0)2) ≥ π((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 0)2)
if the agent does not revise his platform in the second dimension or
π((b, a, ω)1, (b, a, ω)2) ≥ π((b, b, 0)1, (b, a, ω)2)
if he does. We know already from case 1 that
π((b, a, ω)1, (b, b, 0)2) < π((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 0)2).
Given that γ1b = 0 we can derive
π((b, b, 0)1, (b, a, ω)2) =
θ̄(1 − θ̄)
θ̄(1 − θ̄ + (1 − γ2b )(1 − θ)θβ1β2
,
which is obviously larger than π((b, a, ω)1, (b, a, ω)2) under γ1b = 0, so γ
1
b = 0 cannot be an
equilibrium outcome under m1 
= x1 and m2 
= x2 either.
Note however that both π((b, a, ω)1, (b, b, 1)2) and π((b, a, ω)1, (b, a, ω)2) are increasing in γ1b
while both π((b, b, 0)1, (b, b, 0)2) and π((b, b, 0)1, (b, a, ω)2) are decreasing in γ1b . Hence, by the
intermediate value theorem there exists γ1b which solves the equations above with equality
and therefore constitutes an equilibrium. Since we derived this for arbitrary γ2b the same
argument can be made for the gambling decision in the other dimension. ‖
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3.1 Introduction
In many situations of economic relevance a principal has to either delegate a decision to an
agent or rely on information the agent transmits, since the principal lacks sufficient informa-
tion or expertise to perform the task independently. Examples include such diverse settings
as delegated portfolio management or advisers of a political decision maker (as in Morris
(2001)). If the agent’s information can be verified full information disclosure can often be
sustained as an equilibrium outcome (see e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) on disclosure of
private certifiable information.). The same holds true if the principal can design a mechanism
to elicit information.
If these condition are not satisfied, however, inefficiencies might arise due to divergence of
preferences as in standard cheap talk games1 or due to the agent’s desire to appear well
informed. These situations have been analyzed in so called expert games: here an agent
(the expert) is hired in order to make a decision on behalf of the principal.2 He bases his
decision on his private information whose accuracy is determined by his type. In contrast to
a classical cheap talk game the agent does not care about the decision per se, but only about
the decision’s impact on the principal’s assessment of his type. These kind of preferences can
be rationalized by means of future reemployment considerations, for example. In the exam-
ples mentioned above such incentives arguably play an important role: politicians or their
advisers care about reelection which is partially determined by the electorate’s assessment of
their ability.3 The same is probably true for other state officials.4 As a further example, the
behavior of fund managers is driven by such career concerns, a point empirically confirmed
by Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and theoretically elaborated by Dasgupta and Prat (2005,
2006).
This paper examines the consequences of information acquisition by experts. To analyze this,
we extend an expert model to two periods where in each period the agent acquires additional
1The first paper analyzing the outcome in cheap talk games is Crawford and Sobel (1982). A more recent
reference is Battaglini (2002); Krishna and Morgan (2007) gives a very comprehensive overview.
2It could also be that the agent is just supposed to making a recommendation to the principal who then makes
the decision. In the framework of this paper this distinction is immaterial.
3See for example Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) or Majumdar and Mukand (2004).
4Levy (2005) builds a model of the incentives of judges where the behavior of the judges in driven by such
career concerns.
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information. The agent can act at different points in time and the principal can observe the
timing decision of the agent. There are a lot of situations where this setting seems realistic:
fund managers can decide whether to invest early or late in certain stocks, for example. The
set up allows us to shed light on questions like: Do agents have an incentive to accumulate
information? If so, which agents? Does the principal necessarily benefit from better informed
agents? Or might there be an incentive for the principal to restrict information acquisition
and force agents to act early?
It turns out that more information on the agent’s side does not unambiguously benefit the
principal. Of course, more information improves the quality of decision making which bene-
fits both the principal and the agent. However, in some situations the behavior of the agents
is further distorted through more information acquisition. If the agent has gathered more
than one signal an additional effect comes into play which is best understood if one considers
efficient decision making first. Efficiency dictates that the agent chooses those actions, which
from an ex ante point of view are less likely to be optimal, only if his information in favor
of these actions is sufficiently strong. In case this is not true, which will happen especially
if the expert has received contradictory information, he should opt for a “standard” action.
However, since the better the agent the more correlated is his information over time, pre-
dominantly bad experts will end up with conflicting signals.5 Hence, under efficient decision
making, the standard actions carry a reputational discount as they are selected mainly by
unable experts. In equilibrium this effect might lead to inefficiencies as some agents will be
tempted to choose the reputationally more valuable action even if their own information is
not precise enough. As we will illustrate in the model, this wedge between different actions
only emerges if agents have accumulated more than one piece of information. Therefore it
might be beneficial for the principal to restrict the agents and force them to make their de-
cision early.6
The paper can thus also be seen as a contribution to the literature on optimal delegation.
Here the principal does not restrict which actions are available to the agent (as for example
in Alonso and Matouschek (2007)), but at which point in time the agent is supposed to act.
There is also a completely different rationale behind the principal’s desire to restrict the
5The better the agent the higher the probability that the signal is correct. Hence better agents are more likely
to receive identical signals, as in case of contradictory signals at least one signal must have been wrong.
6One way to achieve this may be work overload of the agents. See section 4 for a more detailed discussion.
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agents. The reason does not lie in an imperfect alignment of preferences which induces the
agents to choose the wrong action from the principal’s point of view. In fact the principal
and the agent share the same objective as the agents want to choose the correct action. Re-
stricting the agents may nevertheless be valuable, since the accumulation of more information
might aggravate distortions due to strategic behavior. In the framework of an expert game,
this paper is the first one which shows that the principal might indeed be hurt by agents
holding better information.
3.1.1 Related Literature
The paper is related to several strands of the literature a few of which have been mentioned
already. There is a link to the literature on optimal delegation and, obviously, on cheap talk.
As the agent cares about the principal’s assessment of his ability, this paper fits into the lit-
erature on career concerns, which has been pioneered by Holmström (1999) and generalized
by Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999a,b). There an agent’s ability increases expected
output and the agent exerts unobservable effort to improve some performance measure. Here,
in contrast, the agent’s type determines the precision of the information she receives. This
information is private but the principal can observe the action chosen by the agent.
The literature on experts started with a famous paper by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) who
analyzed sequential decision making by multiple experts.7 This allows them to study incen-
tives to herd on previous agent’s actions. The herding result depends crucially on the agent’s
objective function: Effinger and Polborn (2001) show that anti-herding can be an equilibrium
outcome if the agents care sufficiently about their relative reputation.
The issue of the timing of decision making has not received attention in the literature on
experts, but was analyzed in the context of statistical herding models. Statistical herding
occurs whenever an agent disregards his own signal because the actions of her predecessors
at least partially reveal their information. If this information is stronger than the agent’s
own information it is optimal to follow the predecessors independently of one’s own signals.
See Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) for early contributions
in this realm. Following these papers there are a few contributions where agents can endoge-
7See Ottaviani and Sorensen (2000) for a generalization.
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nously determine when to act but can not influence the amount of information they receive.
Gul and Russell (1995) establish that endogenous sequencing leads to delay and a clustering
of agent’s decision. As actions are public and reveal (part of) the private information agents
delay their actions in order learn other agent’s private information. As soon as the first agent
has moved (this will be the agent with the most extreme signal realization) others follow im-
mediately (clustering of actions). In Zhang (1997) the model is extended to two dimensional
uncertainty: not only are the signal realizations private information but also the accuracy of
the information. The equilibrium of this model also exhibits initial delay; once the first agent
(here the one with the most precise signal) has moved, again all others follow immediately.
While we share with these papers the focus on the timing of decision making, I will only
consider settings with a single agent who has to make only one decision, so herding is not an
issue. Moreover, in contrast to the statistical herding literature agents in this chapter care
about their reputation. In what follows I will give a short overview over the reputational
expert literature, which can be divided into two parts depending whether the agent knows
his own type or not.
The problem if the agent is ignorant about his own type and receives only one signal, has
been extensively studied in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a,b). They show that quite gener-
ally agents distort their behavior in order to signal competence. Prat (2005) shows that the
problem of inefficient signalling can be alleviated if the principal can only observe whether
the agent has chosen the correct action or not, but not which action in particular.
If the agent knows his type new distortions can arise as shown for example by Trueman
(1994), Prendergast and Stole (1996) Avery and Chevalier (1999), and Levy (2004a). Good
agents, knowing their type will find it optimal to follow their signal more often and contradict
the prior. As the bad agent has an incentive to appear well informed, he will try to mimic
the behavior of good agents. Hence, it will be optimal for him to contradict the prior even if
his information is not precise enough to outweigh the prior.
The only paper in this literature which allows for an endogenous information structure is
Levy (2004a). Here the agent can resort to an external consultant and gather additional in-
formation. She shows that the agent has an incentive to ignore or even excessively contradict
the consultant in order to gain reputation. The result is thus complementary to ours as it
too studies the behavioral distortions arising if more information about the optimal course of
action is available. However, there are two important differences which make the mechanism
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at work quite distinct from the one at work in our model. First, the quality of additional
information is independent of the expert and second, the consultant’s recommendation is
publicly observable. By contradicting the consultant, the agent can signal that his informa-
tion is superior.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the model. The next two
parts of the chapter present the analysis when agents have to move in the first or second
period respectively. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3.2 The Model
I consider a model with two time periods t = 1, 2 and two players, an agent A and an
evaluator E. In every period the agent can choose an action dt ∈ {a, b} which I assume to be
irreversible.
Which action is best depends on the realization of a state of the world x ∈ {a, b}. The prior
probability of x = a being the true state of the world is denoted by q ≥ 12 . In addition,
the agent receives a signal st ∈ {a, b} about x in every period immediately before she can
make the decision. The precision of the signal depends on the agents type θ ∈ Θ := {θ, 1},
θ ∈ [12 , 1] in the following way:
Prob(st = a|x = a, θ) = Prob(st = b|x = b, θ) = θ.
Hence, we assume that the agent’s type denotes the probability with which a correct signal
is obtained. The quality of the signal therefore increases in the agent’s type with the case of
θ = 12 corresponding to the situation where the bad agent receives pure noise. Note that the
good type θ = 1 gets a perfect signal in every period.8 I assume that conditional on the true
state x the signals are drawn independently in every period. The true state is revealed to all
players after the agent has made his decision.
Importantly, I assume that the agent’s type is only known to her. The prior probability of
θ = 1 is given by p.
8For the model to be interesting it is important that the information of the good type is sufficiently precise.
In particular, it must be optimal for the principal to follow the agent’s advice if he knew that the agent was
good. As long as this is satisfied, the exact precision of the good agent’s information does not qualitatively
affect the equilibrium.
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An important ingredient of the model is that the agent’s payoff uA depends positively on the
evaluators assessment of his type.9 I assume that the agent’s payoff is given by her expected
type conditional on all information the evaluator has. The evaluator observes the decision of
the agent, the point in time when the decision was made and the true state of the world.
uA = E(θ|d1, d2, x, p).
The evaluator is a passive player whose only task it is to assess the quality of the agent.10
Throughout the paper I will consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). In such an equi-
librium the agent’s strategy must be optimal given the evaluator’s beliefs. The evaluator
forms beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule using all of his information whenever this is possible.
More formally the agents strategy consists of functions d1(s1|θ) : {a, b} → Δ({a, b}) and
d2(s1, s2|θ) : {a, b}2 → Δ({a, b}).11 The evaluator uses an updating function μ(d1, d2, x, p) :
{a, b} × {a, b} × {a, b} × [0, 1] → [0, 1] which denotes the posterior probability of facing
a good agent. Using the updating function the evaluator can compute E(θ|d1, d2, x, p) =
μ(d1, d2, x, p) + (1 − μ(d1, d2, x, p))θ.
In what comes I will restrict attention to informative equilibria where the agent conditions
his actions on his information.12. Moreover I will ignore all ”mirror” equilibria which take
some equilibrium and just flip every action from a to b and vice versa. 13
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The agent learns his type θ.
2. The agent receives signal s1 and chooses d1.
3. The agent receives s2 and chooses d2.
4. Evaluator observes d1, d2 and x and updates about agent’s type.
9This can be, e.g. due to reemployment or promotion decisions the evaluator has to make in the future.
10This is common in the literature on career concerns. One could interpret the evaluator as consisting of
possible future employers of the agent, who, after having observed the agent’s performance, are willing to
offer a wage equal to the experts expected reputation for his services.
11Given some set A, Δ(A) denotes the set of all probability distributions over A.
12As common in all cheap talk games there also exists an ”babbling” equilibrium in which the agent’s decisions
does not convey any information about his type and the evaluators belief is independent of any of the agent’s
actions
13This is standard, see e.g. Levy (2004a)
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5. Payoffs realized.
3.3 Analysis with a Single Period
As a benchmark case and in order to gain some intuition into the workings of the model,
consider first a situation where the agent has to make his decision in t = 1.14 To this end
define V i1 := E(θ|d1 = i, x = i), i = a, b as the reputational payoff for the agent if he chooses
d = i in the first period and x = i. Analogously we define V i1 = E(θ|d1 = i, x 
= i), i = a, b as
the agent’s reputation if he chooses the wrong action. As there is no incentive for the good
type θ = 1 to contradict his signal, we have V i1 = θ.
Assume first that the bad agent decides to follow his signal as well. Note that if the evaluator
correctly anticipates the behavior of the agent this implies V a1 = V
b
1 as
V
a
1 = E(θ|d1 = a, x = a) = Prob(θ = 1|d = a, x = a) · 1 + Prob(θ = θ|d = a, x = a) · θ
=
qp
qp + q(1 − p)θ · 1 +
q(1 − p)θ
qp + q(1 − p)θ · θ =
p + (1 − p)θ2
p + (1 − p)θ ,
and
V
b
1 = E(θ|d1 = b, x = b) = Prob(θ = 1|d = b, x = b) · 1 + Prob(θ = θ|d = b, x = b) · θ
=
(1 − q)p
(1 − q)p + (1 − q)(1 − p)θ · 1 +
(1 − q)(1 − p)θ
(1 − q)p + (1 − q)(1 − p)θ · θ =
p + (1 − p)θ2
p + (1 − p)θ .
As the agent’s payoff depends only on making the correct decision the bad agent has always
an incentive to follow his signal if s1 = a. Formally we see that given s1 = a the agent prefers
d1 = a over d1 = b as
Prob(x = a|s1 = a, θ)V a1+Prob(x = b|s1 = a, θ)V a1 ≥ Prob(x = b|s1 = a, θ)V b1+Prob(x = a|s1 = a, θ)V b1,
because Prob(x = a|s1 = a, θ) ≥ q ≥ 12 .
Following s1 = b in turn is only optimal if
Prob(x = b|s1 = b, θ)V b1+Prob(x = a|s1 = b, θ)V b1 ≥ Prob(x = a|s1 = b, θ)V a1+Prob(x = b|s1 = b, θ)V a1.
14The results in this section can in a slightly different form already be found in Trueman (1994) and in Avery
and Chevalier (1999).
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Note that this condition is only satisfied if Prob(x = b|s1 = b, θ) ≥ Prob(x = a|s1 = b, θ),
i.e. only if θ ≥ q.15 The intuition for this is straightforward. If θ is sufficiently small then a
signal in favor of state b does not outweigh the prior, i.e. even after having observed s1 = b
the bad agent considers state a more likely to be true. Since her utility depends only on
making the correct decision, bad agents have an incentive to contradict their signal. If the
prior probability of state a being true is high enough, this effect may be so strong that the
bad agent does not choose d1 = b anymore. Note that in this case observing d = b and x = a
is an out of equilibrium event. In what follows I assume that the evaluator holds the belief
that he faces a bad agent for sure whenever he observes the inappropriate decision. The
equilibrium of the game can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3.1 In equilibrium the good type will always follow his signal. The behavior of
the bad type depends on the parameters.
1. If θ ≥ q the bad agent will also follow his signal.
2. Let β1 = Prob(d = b|s1 = b). If p ≤ (1−q)θq(1−θ) the bad agent will choose d1 = a whenever
s1 = a and d1 = b with probability β̂1 if s1 = b where β̂1 is the unique solution to
p + (1 − p)θβ̂1
1 − (1 − p)(1 − θ)β̂1
=
(1 − q)θ
q(1 − θ) .
3. If p > (1−q)θq(1−θ) the bad agent will always choose d1 = a.
Proof: See the appendix.
Part one of the proposition asserts that the bad agent will always follow his signal if it is
efficient to do so. The last part stipulates that the bad agent will abstain from d1 = b if, even
after having observed a signal in favor of state b, she still puts sufficiently large probability
on state a being true. In this case the likelihood ratio (1−q)θq(1−θ) on the right hand side becomes
sufficiently small. This will hold true whenever the difference between q and θ is large, i.e.
if either there is a strong prior in favor of state a and/or the information of the bad agent
is very noisy. In intermediate cases (part 2 of the proposition) the bad agent randomizes
between both actions given she received signal b. To understand the equilibrium condition
15This implies that agents will always follow their signal if q = 1
2
. Notice that this is also efficient.
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note that one can write the left hand side as
p + (1 − p)θβ̂1
p + (1 − p)[θ + (1 − θ)(1 − β̂1)]
which exactly gives the probability that d = b will be chosen conditional on x = b relative to
the probability of d = a conditional on x = a. This expression is a measure of the relative
reputational payoffs attached to the different actions. If β̂1 declines, the bad agent switches
away from action b and hence, the expected type upon observing d = a decreases. As a
direct consequence the reputation earned upon having selected d = a correctly decreases as
well, and so does the left hand side of the equilibrium condition. When will it be optimal to
shy away from the unexpected action b? Only when the right hand side of the equilibrium
condition goes down as well, hence, if state a is ex ante more likely and if the information
quality of the agent deteriorates (i.e. θ declines).
We can therefore conclude that the randomization decision trades off two effects: on the
one hand, as the bad agent chooses d = b less often, a higher reputation can be gained by
correctly selecting action b compared to action a. On the other hand however, given that
the information of the bad type is not precise enough to outweigh the prior, d = b is correct
with a smaller probability. It is clear then that the randomization probability decreases if
the latter effect becomes larger, i.e. if the prior rises or θ decreases.
Note that the agent behaves inefficiently in this intermediate case. Although his information
suggests state a being the most probable, the agent chooses d1 = b with some probability.
3.4 Second Period Decision Making
I now turn to the analysis when the agent must make his decision in the second period.
Define V i2 (V
i
2) analogously as the reputation of the agent after having correctly (incorrectly)
chosen action i in the second period.
The behavior of the good type is not affected. She will still choose the action prescribed by
her signals. The bad agent in contrast can now end up with three different posteriors. Either
she has received two identical signals (s1 = s2 = a or s1 = s2 = b) or two contradictory signals
(s1 
= s2).16 In the first case the agent believes with a higher probability that the signals
indicate the true state of the world compared to a situation where she received only one
16Notice that the good agent never receives two different signals.
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signal. In the latter case the signals exactly offset each other and the agent puts probability
q on state a being true. The following figure illustrates the different posterior assessments of
the agent dependent whether she received only one signal (as in the previous section) or two
signals.
As one moves from the left to the right, state b is considered to be more likely. The lower

1 − q
1 − q
1
2




Pr(x=a|s1=s2=b)Pr(x=a|s1=s2=a) Pr(x=a|s1 =s2)
Pr(x=a|s1=b)Pr(x=a|s1=a)
Pr(x=b)
Figure 3.1: Posteriors of the bad agent
half of the figure illustrates how the bad agent’s assessment of state b being true changes
conditional on the signal she receives. Starting from the prior 1 − q the agent puts even less
probability on state b being true if he obtains s1 = a. In the figure we implicitly assumed that
θ < q so even after having observed a signal in favor of b the bad agent assigns a probability
smaller than 12 of state b being true.
The upper side of the figure illustrates the agent’s posterior if he has received two signals.
In case of two conflicting signals the posterior equals the prior. Identical signals, however,
pull the posterior more strongly to the indicated state. In the figure the bad agent’s signal
is good enough, such that two signals in favor of state b more than offset the prior.
It turns out that it is of crucial importance which decision is made given the two signals
are not equal, as this influences the reputation which is attached to an agent successfully
choosing action a or b (still assuming that the evaluator correctly anticipates the behavior
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of the agents.). In particular, the action which is chosen after s1 
= s2 carries a lower
reputational value. As contradictory signals are only received by bad agents, the action
chosen after s1 
= s2 is made by a bad agent with a higher probability. This already indicates
that it cannot be an equilibrium outcome that d2(s1 
= s2) = b, since in this case d = b
would carry a reputational discount and would be correct with smaller probability compared
to d = a. This intuition can be formally confirmed.
Lemma 3.1 If s1 
= s2 the bad agent will play d2 = a with strictly positive probability.
Proof: See the appendix.
How large this probability is in equilibrium depends on q. Assume that d2(s1 
= s2) = a with
probability one. In this case the decision d2 = a carries a reputational discount while d2 = b
gives a higher reputation to the agent. Choosing d2 = b correctly is a better signal about
the agent’s type since the evaluator knows that the agent must have received two correct
signals. In contrast, upon observing that decision a was selected correctly, the evaluator can
only infer that the agent has received at least one correct signal. The former is much more
probable for good relative to bad agents, hence V b2 > V
a
2 (see the appendix for a formal
proof). However, for this to be an equilibrium outcome, an agent with two conflicting signals
must find it optimal to select action a. He will do so if
qV
a
2 + (1 − q)θ ≥ (1 − q)V b2 + qθ.
Given the wedge between V b2 and V
a
2 this condition is satisfied only if q is larger than some
threshold value q̂.17
Case 1: q ≥ q̂ Assume first that this is the case. It is clear that if d2(s1 
= s2) = a is
optimal than d2(s1 = s2 = a) = a will be optimal as well. But similar to the the one period
case the bad agent has an incentive to contradict his signals in case of s1 = s2 = b if his
information is sufficiently bad. Formally, it holds true that
Prob(x = b|s1 = s2 = b, θ)V b2 + Prob(x = a|s1 = s2 = b, θ)θ
<
Prob(x = b|s1 = s2 = b, θ)θ + Prob(x = a|s1 = s2 = b, θ)V a2.
17As V
a
2 is always larger than θ the existence of q is guaranteed.
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given that θ is low enough.18 The structure of the equilibrium will resemble the one in the one
period case as the agent will contradict signals in favor of b with at least some probability.
The equilibrium is summarized in the following proposition where I assume again that E
believes to face a bad agent with probability one in case of an inappropriate decision.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose q ≥ q̂ and define κ := p+(1−p)θ2p+(1−p)θ(2−θ) . In equilibrium the good agent
will always follow his signal.
1. The bad agent always chooses d2 = a if p >
(1−q)θ2
q(1−θ)2 .
2. Suppose p ≤ (1−q)θ2
q(1−θ)2 ≤ κ. Then the bad agent will set d2 = a if either s1 = s2 = a
or s1 
= s2. If s1 = s2 = b the agent chooses d = b with probability β̂2 > β̂1 implicitly
defined by
p + (1 − p)θ2β̂2
1 − (1 − p)(1 − θ)2β̂2
=
(1 − q)θ2
q(1 − θ)2 .
3. Suppose (1−q)θ
2
q(1−θ)2 > κ. Then the bad agent follows his signal whenever s1 = s2 and
chooses d2 = a in case of s1 
= s2.
Proof: See the appendix.
The intuition for this equilibrium is similar to proposition 3.1. Note first that the likelihood
ratio (1−q)θ
2
q(1−θ)2 again measures how probable it is that state b is true relative to state a, given
that two signals in favor of b have been observed.
The bad agent will again disregard his signal and always choose d2 = a if the evidence in
favor of state b is weak. This happens for large values of q and small values of θ. If the
information of the agent becomes better she will randomize between decision a and b if she
receives two signals in favor of state b. The equilibrium condition again equates the likelihood
ratio of both states being true with the relative reputational payoffs attached to the different
actions. Only if the posterior probability of state b is sufficiently high the agent follows his
information.
It is important to note that conditional on s1 = s2 = b the agent chooses d2 = b more often
18In the extreme case where θ = 1
2
the agent does not receive any information and so the posterior equals the
prior. We know then from the definition of q that the bad type will not find it optimal to follow his signals
if s1 = s2 = b.
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if he has to decide in the second period compared to the decision in the first period. There
are two reasons for this. First, given s1 = s2 the evidence in favor of state b being true
is now stronger. However there is a second effect which makes the agent more aggressive.
As already noted above, the fact that d2 = b is chosen only with two confirmatory signals
while for d2 = a at least one signal in favor of state a must have been received, leads to
a reputational “premium” of decision b relative to decision a even if the agent does not
randomize.
Hence letting the agent decide in the second period may lead to strategic distortions in the
behavior of the agents. An interesting fact is that this distortion can more than offset the
benefits of better information which can be accumulated.
Proposition 3.3 If θ is low enough (and smaller than q) the probability of a wrong decision
is higher if the agent acts in the second period only.
It should be rather obvious that θ < q is necessary for inefficient decision making to increase.
If the agent does not randomize in any of the two equilibria under consideration, decision
making will be better in the second period as more information is utilized.
However, if the bad agent randomizes, additional distortions can arise. As an illustration
consider a parameter constellation such that the agent randomizes between a and b if he has
obtained one, respectively two signals in favor of state b. We know from the proposition that
β̂2 > β̂1. Consider now the limit case where θ = 12 . In this case the bad agent receives only
noise while the information quality of the good agent does not improve through a second
perfect signal either. The probability of a correct decision declines strictly when a second
signal is acquired, as the bad agent should efficiently choose d = a regardless of his information
(remember that q ≥ q̂ > 12). As θ rises the decision made by the bad agent improves since
d2 = b if and only if the agent has received two signals in favor of it. Hence the evidence
of state b being true becomes stronger. For θ high enough this effect of better information
offsets the stronger inclination to choose d = b if agents acquire two signals.
Hence, if the evaluator or a principal is interested in correct decision making he may benefit
from forcing the agent to act early and forgo useful information. An interesting question is
how the principal can achieve this. One possible way might be work overload of the agents
which prevents them from gathering additional information. The role of work overload in
mitigating agency problems has been already identified in previous work. In Aghion and
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Tirole (1997) work overload on the principal’s side serves as a commitment device not to
interfere with the agent’s decisions. Although not optimal ex post, this commitment gives
better incentives to the agents ex ante. Laux (2001) focuses on a different mechanism. He
notes that bundling several tasks and allocating them to a single agent might reduce agency
cost stemming from limited liability. The rationale for overload offered here is quite different.
In contrast to Aghion and Tirole (1997), here it may be optimal to overburden the agent,
not his principal in order to achieve better decision making. Moreover, in Aghion and Tirole
(1997) the probability that the agent makes a valuable decision increases in the principal’s
work load, but the decision per se remains the same. Here it is that work overload has a
direct impact on which decision the agent makes.
Case 2: q < q̂ In the analysis above the “inferior” action d = a was sustainable as in
the case of s1 
= s2 the agent was compensated for the lower reputation with a higher success
probability. However, if q is sufficiently close to 12 , playing d2(s1 
= s2) = a with probability
one is no longer optimal as the reputational wedge between the different actions is too large
to be offset by the different success probabilities. Formally,
qV
a
2 + (1 − q)θ ≥ (1 − q)V b2 + qθ
is violated for small values of q. Hence in the only equilibrium the agent will now randomize
between both actions if she has received two contradictory signals. As the agent is now
indifferent between both actions after having received no information, she will strictly prefer
to follow her signal in case of s1 = s2. The equilibrium is formally described in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose q < q̂. Both agents will follow their signal if s1 = s2. In case of
contradictory signals the agent chooses d = b with probability β̂3, where β̂3 < 12 is implicitly
defined by the unique solution to
p + (1 − p)θ(1 − (1 − θ)(1 − 2β̂3))
p + (1 − p)θ(1 + (1 − θ)(1 − 2β̂3))
=
1 − q
q
.
Proof: See the appendix.
If ex ante both states of the world are considered to be almost equally likely, there does not
exist an ”inferior” action anymore which is chosen without new information. Still as long as
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q ≥ 12 , action a will carry a lower reputational value than action b.19 This is only possible if
the bad agent chooses d2 = a with higher probability, hence β̂3 < 12 .
Next, we will examine the consequences of additional information on the principal’s well
being, in particular, on the probability of a wrongful decision. It turns out that the principal
always benefits from better information if the prior on the two states is balanced enough (i.e.
q ≤ q̂).
Proposition 3.5 Consider the case of q < q̂. Then under second period decision making
the probability of success is always higher.
Proof: See the appendix.
If the agents postpone their decision they will make better informed decisions which benefits
the principal directly. Additionally, if q < q̂ the distortions arising from strategic behavior
are also smaller. Two forces drive this result. Given that the agent must decide in the first
period, she holds weaker information in favor of state b when selecting d = b. In the second
period the agent has either acquired two contradictory signals or two signals in favor of state
b but the randomization probability is such that on average, the evidence in favor of x = b
is stronger. Additionally, as shown in the appendix the agent chooses the inefficient action b
with strictly lower probability.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper examined the consequences of information acquisition in an expert setting, where
an agent (the expert) who is primarily concerned with his reputation, has to make a rec-
ommendation to a principal. It was shown that while better informed agents make correct
recommendations more often, more information also has a potential downside. As bad agents
try to mimic good ones, their behavior suffers from excessive “experimentation”, i.e. they se-
lect ex ante less likely actions to often from an efficiency point of view. This distortion can be
aggravated if agents hold better information, since an additional reputational wedge is driven
19Again the agent must be compensated for the lower success probability if he chooses d2(s1 = s2) = b with
a higher reputation in case of success.
Information Acquisition by Experts 86
between different actions. This additional wedge can hurt the principal if he is concerned
with correct decision making. But a different dimension of interest might be the selection of
agents. If the principal’s primary focus is on selecting able agents and sorting out bad ones,
another rationale for restricting agent’s access to information arises. Superior competence
can be better assessed if the error probability of bad agents increases. So especially in the
beginning of their career, when arguably selection is more important than correct decision
making, agent’s might be overburdened with work.20 More generally speaking, one could
think of the organizational structure as a whole being designed such that career concerns of
agents are optimally exploited. Koch and Peyrache (2005) is a very interesting first step in
that direction.
Although this paper attempted to advance our understanding of expert models by consider-
ing a rather obvious extension, a host of further extensions are still unexplored. To name a
few, the role of multiple experts is still poorly understood in that setting. As shown by De-
watripont and Tirole (1999), forcing agents to advocate a certain standpoint increases effort.
In a pure cheap talk setting, Krishna and Morgan (2001) explore the role of consulting mul-
tiple agents. Under certain conditions, if the agents are not too strongly biased in opposite
directions, this can improve on information transmission.
To make full use of multiple experts, it might be necessary to augment reputational incen-
tives with explicit incentive schemes. Zwiebel (1995) already noted that relative reputational
concerns are of major interest.21 However, those relative concerns can also be created with
contracts specifying some form of relative performance evaluation. Hopefully those issues
will be examined in more detail in the near future.
20The issue of selection in expert settings has received little attention so far. A notable exception is Prat
(2005).
21See Effinger and Polborn (2001).
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3.6 Appendix
Proof of proposition 3.1
Part one of the proposition is already shown in the text. For the other parts, first define
the reputational values of choosing d = a and d = b if a bad agent sets d(s1 = b) = b with
probability β1 and plays d = a otherwise.
V
a
1(β1) = Prob(θ = 1|d = a, x = a) · 1 + Prob(θ = θ|d = a, x = a) · θ =
p
p + (1 − p)(θ + (1 − θ)(1 − β1)) · 1 +
(1 − p)(θ + (1 − θ)(1 − β1))
p + (1 − p)(θ + (1 − θ)(1 − β1)) · θ
V
b
1(β1) = Prob(θ = 1|d = b, x = b) · 1 + Prob(θ = θ|d = b, x = b) · θ =
p
p + (1 − p)θβ1 · 1 +
(1 − p)θβ1
p + (1 − p)θβ1 · θ
To understand this expression note that good types (which occur with probability p) always
implement the correct policy. Bad agents, in turn, choose action a correctly if they receive
the correct signal (which happens with probability θ) and if they obtain a wrong signal but
decide to contradict it (which happens with probability (1 − θ)(1 − β1)).
If the agent randomizes between both actions the following equality must hold
Prob(x = a|s1 = b, θ)V a1(β1)+Prob(x = b|s1 = b, θ)·θ = Prob(x = b|s1 = b, θ)·V b1(β1)+Prob(x = a|s1 = b, θ)·θ,
which is true if
q(1 − θ) [V a1(β1) − θ] = (1 − q)θ [V b1(β1) − θ]
⇐⇒
q(1 − θ)
[
p(1 − θ)
p + (1 − p)(θ + (1 − θ)(1 − β1))
]
= (1 − q)θ
[
p(1 − θ)
p + (1 − p)θβ1
]
⇐⇒
p + (1 − p)θβ1
p + (1 − p)(θ + (1 − θ)(1 − β1)) =
(1 − q)θ
q(1 − θ)
⇐⇒
p + (1 − p)θβ1
1 − (1 − p)(1 − θ)β1 =
(1 − q)θ
q(1 − θ) .
The right hand side is smaller than one if θ < q. The left hand side is equal to p if β1 = 0
and goes to one as β1 → 1. Moreover, the left hand side is monotonically increasing in β1.
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Hence by the intermediate value theorem, if (1−q)θq(1−θ) ∈ [p, 1] there exist a unique β1 ∈ [0, 1]
which solves the condition in proposition 3.1.
If (1−q)θq(1−θ) < p then it can be easily seen that the payoff from choosing d = a always exceeds
the payoff from d = b. ‖
Proof that V
b
2 > V
a
2 if d2(s1 
= s2) = a
V
a
2 =
p + (1 − p)θ(θ2 + 2θ(1 − θ))
p + (1 − p)(θ2 + 2θ(1 − θ)) =
E(θ3) + (1 − p)2θ2(1 − θ)
E(θ2) + (1 − p)2θ(1 − θ) .
V
b
2 =
p + (1 − p)θ3
p + (1 − p)θ2 =
E(θ3)
E(θ2)
.
The good type will again always choose action a if this is appropriate. Bad agents will do
so if they receive the correct signal twice (which occurs with probability θ2) or in case of
contradictory signals (which happens with probability 2θ(1 − θ)). V b2 > V a2 if
E(θ3) · E(θ2) + E(θ3)(1 − p)2θ(1 − θ) > E(θ3) · E(θ2) + E(θ2)(1 − p)2θ2(1 − θ)
⇐⇒
θE(θ2) < E(θ3),
which is always satisfied. ‖
Proof of Lemma 3.1
We have just shown that the action which is chosen only with two confirmatory signals bears
a higher reputation in case of success. Assume this action would be a, i.e. d2(s1 
= s2) = b.
This would imply V b2 < V
a
2. In case of two contradictory signals, the bad agent must have
an incentive to choose b. But
(1 − q)V b2 + qθ ≥ qV a2 + (1 − q)θ
can only be satisfied if V b2 > V
a
2, a contradiction. ‖
Proof of proposition 3.2
Let q ≥ q̂ which implies d(s1 
= s2) = a. Define β2 = Prob(d2 = b|s1 = s2 = b, θ).
V
b
2(β2) = Prob(θ = 1|d2 = b, x = b) · 1 + Prob(θ = θ|d2 = b, x = b) · θ =
=
p
p + (1 − p)θ2β2
· 1 + (1 − p)θ
2β2
p + (1 − p)θ2β2
· θ.
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V
a
2(β2) = Prob(θ = 1|d2 = a, x = a) · 1 + Prob(θ = θ|d2 = a, x = a) · θ =
p
p + (1 − p)[θ2 + 2θ(1 − θ) + (1 − β2)(1 − θ)2]
· 1 + (1 − p)[θ
2 + 2θ(1 − θ) + (1 − β2)(1 − θ)2]
p + (1 − p)[θ2 + 2θ(1 − θ) + (1 − β2)(1 − θ)2]
· θ.
To understand these expressions note that the denominator of V a2 gives the probability that
action a is chosen correctly in equilibrium. The good type will always choose correctly, while
the bad type sets d2 = a if either he receives two signals in favor of a (this happens with
probability θ2) or two mixed signals (probability 2θ(1 − θ)). She will also choose d = a with
probability 1 − β2 if she receives two signals in favor of state b (probability (1 − θ)2). The
other expressions can be interpreted analogously.
For randomization to be an equilibrium outcome we must have
Prob(x = a|s1 = s2 = b, θ)V a2(β2) + Prob(x = b|s1 = s2 = b, θ) · θ =
Prob(x = b|s1 = s2 = b, θ) · V b2(β2) + Prob(x = a|s1 = s2 = b, θ) · θ,
⇐⇒
q(1 − θ)2 [V a2(β2) − θ] = (1 − q)θ2 [V b2(β2) − θ]
⇐⇒
q(1 − θ)2
[
p(1 − θ)
p + (1 − p)[θ2 + 2θ(1 − θ) + (1 − β2)(1 − θ)2]
]
= (1 − q)θ2
[
p(1 − θ)
p + (1 − p)θ2β2
]
⇐⇒
p + (1 − p)θ2β2
p + (1 − p)[β2(2θ − θ2) + (1 − β2)]
=
(1 − q)θ2
q(1 − θ)2
⇐⇒
p + (1 − p)θ2β2
p + (1 − p)[1 − β2(1 − θ)2] =
(1 − q)θ2
q(1 − θ)2 ,
which is the condition stated in the proposition which implicitly defines the randomization
probability (existence can be shown completely analogous to proposition 3.1).
Note that the left hand side is monotonically increasing in β2 and takes on values between p
for β2 = 0 and
p+(1−p)θ2
p+(1−p)θ(2−θ) := κ for β2 = 1. If the right hand side is larger than κ, β2 = 1
is optimal, i.e. the agent always follows his signal. If the right hand side falls short of p
the agent will optimally set β2 = 0. This proves the optimality of the strategy stated in the
proposition.
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What remains to be shown is that β2 > β1. As
(1−q)θ2
q(1−θ)2 ≥ (1−q)θq(1−θ) it is sufficient to show that
∀β : p + (1 − p)θ
2β
p + (1 − p)[1 − β(1 − θ)2] ≤
p + (1 − p)θβ
1 − (1 − p)(1 − θ)β .
Figure 2 illustrates this.
We have already seen that for β = 0 both terms are equal to p. Note that one can write the


β
(1−q)θ2
q(1−θ)2
(1−q)θ
q(1−θ)
p
p+(1−p)θ2β
p+(1−p)[1−β(1−θ)2]
p+(1−p)θβ
1−(1−p)(1−θ)β
β̂1 β̂2
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the equilibrium
term on the left hand side also as
p + (1 − p)θ2β
1 − (1 − p)β(1 − θ)2 .
As the numerator is smaller and the denominator is larger compared to the respective terms
on the right hand side it is now obvious to see that the condition is satisfied, hence β2 > β1.
‖
Proof of proposition 3.3
The probability of a wrong decision in the first period is given by
q[(1 − θ)β1] + (1 − q)[(1 − θ) + θ(1 − β1)] = q[(1 − θ)β1] + (1 − q)[1 − θβ1].
Whenever the true state is a then the wrong decision is only made if the agent receives an
incorrect signal (which happens with probability 1− θ) and chooses action b (which happens
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with probability β1). If x = b the agent chooses d1 = a if she obtained the wrong signal
(which happens with probability (1 − θ)), but also with probability (1 − β1) if she received
the correct signal.
In an completely analogous way we derive the probability of a wrong decision in the second
period as
q[(1 − θ)2β2] + (1 − q)[1 − β2θ2].
Therefore, the probability of a mistake in the second period exceeds the one in the first period
if
q(1 − θ)[β1 − (1 − θ)β2] < (1 − q)θ[β1 − β2θ].
From proposition 3.1 and 3.2 we can derive β1(q) =
(1−q)θ−pq(1−θ)
θ(1−θ)(1−p) and β2(q) =
(1−q)θ2−pq(1−θ)2
θ2(1−θ)2(1−p) .
Inserting , one obtains
q
pq(2θ − 1)(1 − θ)
θ2(1 − p > (1 − q)
(1 − q)(2θ − 1)θ
(1 − θ)2(1 − p) ,
which is satisfied whenever
q2
θ2
p(1 − θ) > (1 − q)
2
(1 − θ)2 θ.
One can directly see that θ < q is necessary for this condition to be satisfied. If θ approaches
1
2 the condition becomes q
2p > (1 − q)2 which is satisfied if p and q are large enough. ‖
Proof of proposition 3.4
Suppose q ≤ q̂ and define β3 := Prob(d = b|s1 
= s2). The reputational payoffs of the different
actions are given by22
V
a
2(β3) = Prob(θ = 1|d2 = a, x = a) · 1 + Prob(θ = θ|d2 = a, x = a) · θ =
=
p
p + (1 − p)[θ2 + (1 − β3)2θ(1 − θ)]
· 1 + (1 − p)[θ
2 + (1 − β3)2θ(1 − θ)]
p + (1 − p)[θ2 + (1 − β3)2θ(1 − θ)]
· θ
=
p + (1 − p)[θ + θ(1 − θ)(1 − 2β3)]θ
p + (1 − p)[θ + θ(1 − θ)(1 − 2β3)]
V
b
2(β3) = Prob(θ = 1|d2 = b, x = b) · 1 + Prob(θ = θ|d2 = b, x = b) · θ =
=
p
p + (1 − p)[θ2 + β32θ(1 − θ)]
· 1 + (1 − p)[θ
2 + β32θ(1 − θ)]
p + (1 − p)[θ2 + β32θ(1 − θ)]
· θ
=
p + (1 − p)[θ − θ(1 − θ)(1 − 2β3)]θ
p + (1 − p)[θ − θ(1 − θ)(1 − 2β3)]
22Notice that we make use of the fact that if the agent randomizes in case of mixed signals she will have an
incentive to follow her signals if s1 = s2.
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Indifference implies that
qV
a
2(β3) + (1 − q)θ = (1 − q)V b2(β3) + qθ
⇐⇒
q[V a2(β3) − θ] = (1 − q)[V b2(β3) − θ]
⇐⇒
q
[
p(1 − θ)
p + (1 − p)[θ + θ(1 − θ)(1 − 2β3)]
]
= (1 − q)
[
p(1 − θ)
p + (1 − p)[θ − θ(1 − θ)(1 − 2β3)]
]
,
from which the proposition follows immediately. ‖
Proof of proposition 3.5
The probability of a mistake in the second period can be written as
(1 − θ)2 + 2θ(1 − θ)[β3(q)q + (1 − β3(q))(1 − q)],
where from proposition 3.4 we obtain β3(q) = 12 − (2q−1)E(θ)2(1−p)(1−θ)θ . The first term denotes the
probability of receiving two wrong signals, while the second term gives the probability of
getting two contradictory signals and choosing the wrong action.
Consider first the case where the bad agent does not randomize in the first period, i.e. θ ≥ q.
The error probability in the first period is then simply given by 1−θ. If the error probability
in the second period was higher it must be true that
1 − θ < (1 − θ)2 + 2θ(1 − θ)[β3(q)q + (1 − β3(q))(1 − q)]
⇐⇒
1
2
< [β3(q)q + (1 − β3(q))(1 − q)]
⇐⇒
− (2q − 1)qE(θ)
2(1 − p)(1 − θ)θ +
(2q − 1)(1 − q)E(θ)
2(1 − p)(1 − θ)θ > 0,
which can never be the case given that (1 − q) < q.
Let us now turn to the case where the agent randomizes in the first period. We now obtain
the following expression for the error probability in the first period:
q(1 − θ)β1(q) + (1 − q)[(1 − θ) + θ(1 − β1(q))] = (1 − θ) − (θ − q)(1 − β1(q)).
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When the agent receives a wrong signal if the true state is a, she chooses the wrong action
with probability β1(q), while she will always make the wrong decision upon receiving the
wrong signal in state b. Additionally, if the state is b the bad agent wrongly contradicts a
correct signal with probability (1 − β1(q)).
Inserting β1(q) =
(1−q)θ−pq(1−θ)
θ(1−θ)(1−p) , one obtains
(1 − θ) − (q − θ)2 E(θ)
θ(1 − θ)(1 − p)
as expression for the error probability in period 1.
The likelihood of a wrongful decision is lower in period 1 if
(1 − θ) − (q − θ)2 E(θ)
θ(1 − θ)(1 − p) ≤ 2θ(1 − θ)
[
1
2
− (2q − 1)
2
E(θ)
2(1 − p)(1 − θ)θ
]
⇐⇒
(1 − θ)2 ≤ [(q − θ)2 − (2q − 1)2] E(θ)
θ(1 − θ)(1 − p) ,
which can never be satisfied since (q−θ)2 < (2q−1)2, so the right hand side is always smaller
than zero. ‖
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